

JPRS-EER-92-057  
8 MAY 1992



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

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# East Europe

JPRS-EER-92-057

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### Local Government Inactivity Criticized

AU0305185292 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE  
in Albanian 18 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Mehil Tanushi: "Drowsy Local Government"]

[Text]

### Suppressed Traditions Must Be Revived

Since the most ancient times, generation after generation, and regardless of changes of government, the Albanian village has preserved a special form of organized authority relying on the basic principles of the Canon [Canon of Leke Dukagjin, traditional Albanian customary law], such as assemblies of men, decisions of councils of village elders, the oath, the word of honor, etc. All problems were discussed and settled at these assemblies, whose decisions were final and mandatory for everybody because they were made in the most perfectly democratic way. Even when two brothers separated to form different households, this step could not be taken without the presence of four or five men who formed a council. They had the right to decide on the household property, land, and the definition of boundaries. The same practice was followed in other cases, from the conciliation of blood feuds to quarrels and misunderstandings among families. Thus the villager received support in his problems and worries. It is only in the last half century that the so-called power of the people denigrated and suppressed these traditions, thus weakening and virtually paralyzing the operation of the state in the countryside. Members of the people's councils were only formally elected and involved themselves so little in the village's problems that people were compelled to wait outside the doors of committees and ministries for days on end over even trivial problems.

The countryside is now in a grievous state with its worries and problems. Peasants have taken land, some according to old boundaries and some in accordance with the law, and this has given rise to new disagreements among families. Old enmities that lead to deaths are being revived. Because of the paralysis of enterprises, workers living in the countryside are unemployed or are receiving 80 percent of their wages, making life even more difficult. Structures built by the agricultural cooperatives have been granted free or sold at very low prices to the peasants on whose land they are situated. There have been extreme cases in the villages of Mirdite: In Sang, a family blocked the road because it passed through its land. In Hebe, the neighbors fenced in a family on all four sides and would not allow its flocks to pass through. The people's councils had no effect in any of these instances. The chairmen and members of these councils generally do not enjoy authority or respect among the people, and what they say is not heeded, because they are chosen solely on the basis of their biography and their political attitudes. Thus, nobody

says "stop" to crime or to speculation, or to the wheeler-dealers who are enriching themselves at the expense of poor peasants.

### Wheeler-Dealers Speculating With Children's Bread

The destruction of the cooperatives involved the destruction of the bread bakeries in many villages. Now every family bakes for itself, despite the trouble involved in grinding the wheat and collecting firewood. However, the main problem is obtaining grain. The councils have not even conclusively solved this problem. Vehicles were sold to private traders at symbolic prices at the whim of the former cooperative chairmen, so that these traders also transport the grain from the wholesalers and cereal depots. However, what in fact happens? Not only is this work not carried out regularly, which often leaves people without bread, but there is increasing speculation with the retail price. The drivers themselves sell the grain, but not at the state's price of 2.50 leks but at three or four leks per kilogram. Of course, there are transport costs, but these should be borne by the state and should not fall on peasants at this time of great dearth. Children must of course not be left without bread, yet peasants are obliged to buy a kilogram of grain twice over. Nobody has the right to speculate with the state's goods, still less when their prices are guaranteed. Is it not hard enough now for a peasant to cope with the prices of other goods, which have climbed sky-high in comparison with his purchasing power?

Once again local government remains silent and has no effect even when it sees speculation with children's bread.

### Exodus of Livestock—A New Rural Blight

Albanian stockraising, devastated by collectivization and decimated by the policy of small herds, is now threatened by a new danger: an exodus. Hundreds and thousands of cattle, sheep, and goats have been driven to neighboring countries. Peasants, partly because of their plight and partly because of the temptation of foreign currency, have gone to any lengths to find markets for sales abroad, not realizing that the purchase prices paid by foreigners are very low and that this great natural resource of our country is shrinking instead of growing. As in all illegal trade, wheeler-dealers operate here, too. They have even succeeded in compromising the border guards; vehicles are loaded in broad daylight with livestock destined for across the border. However, the greatest paradox is that the 500 tons of skins stored in warehouses in the districts cannot be traded without a license, while livestock on the hoof, meat, wool, skin, and all, are spirited away without any question from the state authorities. Another fact is that peasants have nowhere to sell their meat, wool, or skins, because the relevant ministry has suspended their purchase for the last few months because of lack of funds! Meanwhile, enterprises with skins at their disposal produce a hundred excuses even when they find a market for their sale, but they give the skins to private traders at once.

The exodus of livestock is a major evil today, not only for the countryside but for the entire Albanian economy. Like many other irregularities, it takes place under the very eyes of the people's councils. Meanwhile, the people's councils are so disorganized themselves that they are not able to solve any problem. The newly appointed government must therefore take the situation in the countryside in hand immediately until genuinely democratic and well-organized local elections are held, incorporating elements both of tradition and up-to-date law-making.

### **Murders, Quarrels in Land Distribution Condemned**

AU0505130692 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian  
24 Apr 92 pp 1-3

[Article by Sejdin Cekani: "People, Do Not Allow Open Graves!"]

[Text] Quarrels about land have again opened a new grave in the district of Elbasan, this time in the village of Polis. This village has experienced grief as never before. Even the children could not look each other in the eye without bursting into tears. Never before had so many people come to this village to escort the dead man to his last resting place. Never before had hundreds and hundreds of men from all the neighboring villages given way to such tears as rolled down their cheeks. A criminal hand had taken the life of a most honest and hard-working man of the village and a tenderhearted father and compatriot.

Four beautiful children resembling their lamented father, four innocent angels break your heart looking at their grief-stricken faces. Besides the heavy burden of pain, they will be called orphans from now on. Why has this happened? To whom should they turn to complain about their fate? Are they able to contain their grief within their small hearts?

As if poverty were not enough, the horrible shadow of death has been wandering through the village for a long time. This is an everyday worry arising from the quarrels over land. We do not know how many people have been murdered over land so far, but as the peasants say, quarrels over land and water have opened so many graves.

Honored officials and leaders of political parties, have you heard warnings of deaths from ordinary people? Even if these warnings have not reached your ears, just ask and you will learn that this is unfortunately true. If you listen hard, you will also learn that many land commissions have caused open quarrels and disputes. Do not be surprised to hear that two peasants have the same title deed for the same field at the same time. What we are saying now is true, because there have been murders over this. Would it not have been better and fairer according to law and human rights for the land commissions to review and settle disputes in places

where they still exist? If the commissions do not agree (because they have not always done a good job), why not compel them by law?

Every quarrel is a warning that evil can manifest itself at any moment. We believe and hope that besides the legal aspect, every possibility exists of putting a stop to the evil. Perhaps it is high time for some kind of popular institution or association to be formed on this question. Our worthy clergy, with their word and authority, alongside believers and wise people, could perhaps contribute a great deal to this and come to the defense of people's lives.

We should not forget that every murder and open grave encourages a perpetual feud. This sentiment among us persists, sometimes strongly and sometimes less so. Is it not easier and more human to reconcile these quarrels than those of people in a blood feud?

No one is superfluous on our land. There is enough room for everyone to enjoy his life. It is high time to unite, love each other, and enjoy the long-awaited democracy. Instead of graves, we want to see peace and understanding. To achieve this, we should persuade ourselves and others. People, brothers: Do not allow any open graves!

### **Prohibition of Opposition Press in Army Criticized**

AU0305173292 Tirana BASHKIMI in Albanian  
16 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Tomor Bahja: "Democracy or Despotism...!"]

[Text] The idea to write this article dawned on me when, together with a group of reporters, I attended a news conference held by Mr. Sami Mecollari, chairman of the Retired and Released Servicemen's Association on the results of the 20th conference of Euromil, which held its proceedings in Austria from 25 to 27 February. One of the problems that aroused interest was a question by a reporter: Is it fair to deprive the military servicemen of the right to have a daily press in the Army? How is this problem treated in other European countries?

Concerning this problem, Clause 2 of Article 3 of the Law on Depoliticization reads: It is prohibited to distribute the opposition party press in the military units and institutions of the Defense Ministry in an organized way. The question arises: Why? Are the military servicemen people at all? Do they need to be informed? Whom does this attitude serve? Democracy? I say no. In my opinion, this act marks a step backward and may serve despotism, but in no way democracy. If we refer to history, we will notice that no other regime or system, except the Czarist regime in Russia, has prohibited by law the military servicemen from their right to be informed. You can prevent military servicemen, reservists, or those on active duty from adhering to any political party or party propaganda within the territory



of the military units, but you cannot stop them from getting the free democratic press, be it a party or independent publication. This constitutes a flagrant violation of human rights. By acting in this way, i.e. by prohibiting by law the access to the press by the Army, we force the people to find another way, which is reading the press secretly or furtively. Why should we allow such a thing to happen when there exists the possibility that every paper be delivered to the Army and be read in a democratic way?

I was impressed by a case at United Forces Military School several days ago. I was there quite by chance. I noticed that an elderly military official had bought and was reading an opposition party paper on his way to class. When he reached the school entrance, he folded the paper and put it quickly into his pocket as if hiding something stolen that should not be seen by anyone.

In this aspect, the Law on Depoliticization is either nearsightedness by our lawyers who have compiled it or an amplified act aiming at separating the military servicemen from society. History also witnesses cases when soldiers have been sent to actions of a nondemocratic or anticonstitutional character, and they have not protested either due to not knowing the main democratic principles or because of the inhuman structures within the Army. They need life experience on the principle of being military servicemen and the rights and duties deriving from it. This principle has long ago proved to be efficient in a series of countries, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, the Scandinavian countries, etc., in which armed forces are the main component [as published] and a constituent part of democratic society. The European Parliament and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe support the principle on military servicemen. This means that both the military serviceman and the civilian enjoy the same rights. Only in this way will a brittle democracy be steadied.

#### **Article Claims Wheeler-Dealers 'Command' Market**

AU0305174092 Tirana BASHKIMI in Albanian  
16 Apr 92 pp 1-2

[Article by Kristo Mertiri: "Price Liberalization or Albania's Economic Death Sentence?"]

[Text] The prices on the market take your breath away. They have risen to the skies, while people clutch their ration tickets and sink into poverty. This is the bitter and appalling reality, a tremendous earthquake that nobody is preventing. Some wheeler-dealers and experienced sharks are saving their skins quite nicely by brazenly speculating on the needs of honest people with two pennies in their pockets. It is the most extreme kind of polarization: a handful of millionaires and mass destitution! In the case of virtually every item, only the word "price" remains unchanged. We have caught up with and overtaken Europe with the crazily spiraling figures, but remain at the very bottom of the European poverty

league. The chaos is worsening. Psychological, economic, and moral collapse continues. Let us properly realize from the outset that price liberalization is one of the pillars of the economic reform. We are therefore not against it a priori, in principle or in practice. But how has this unbridled liberalization been actually carried out? Without anyone lifting a finger? No!

They tell you at the Finance Ministry that a memorandum signed by the minister was sent to all the ministries and districts at the end of October and the beginning of November last year.

We asked whether we could see the government decree or the law approved by the parliament for this liberalization.

"There is no special decree or law, but read the former minister's memorandum if you like. It is official...."

Such paradoxical behavior does not only affect the formal aspects of this topic that worries the entire people. Prices were suddenly liberalized in Albania at a time when misery has taken root in both the countryside and the towns, standards of living are declining to zero, the majority of workers are shivering with their "80 percent," and our long-suffering peasants have been without a lek in the pockets for a long time. The prices have become virtually the "property" of wheeler-dealers. Certain "businessmen," artful under monism and equally artful and slick under pluralism, are laying down the law in imports and exports. Corruption is gaining its civil rights in broad daylight. For instance, there is no end to the galloping black market in cigarettes. A packet of Cooper has risen to 40 old leks! Our beer has vanished without a trace. "Plenty could be produced, but there are no containers." Is this the real reason? It seems that nothing can demolish the walls built by the millionaire wheeler-dealers. It is hard to find a bottle under 350 old leks. Price liberalization means saying to the state, "Who are you to me?" Privatization in the stores and communal services is almost entirely subject to the pressure of "cartels." How did the state stores vanish so quickly?

"You are asking for the impossible. You cannot find any state today, never mind its stores!"

Auctions have remained merely a figure of speech, or rather a trifle. Plenty of "rumors of kickbacks and swindling" are in circulation about local privatization agencies. Many specialists such as planning officials and accountants are standing idle. This paves the way for vulgar amateurism in the market economy. Some foreign investors have exhausted themselves working through the rusty cogs of the state mechanism. In short, a handful of millionaire wheeler-dealers have begun to command our market, heedless of the law, and at the expense of our exhausted people. It is still not known what goods entered or left Albania last year or this year! Nobody gives you an answer at the General Finance Directorate of the Finance Ministry or at the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. The state remains silent. The law

remains silent. The "businessmen" and the wheeler-dealers do their worst under the cloak of a memorandum about price liberalization. What about taxes and customs duties? Were salaries "liberalized?" Will the legal reform be fully carried out? Meanwhile, many economists say that the Law on Enterprises was "half-baked." Thus, price liberalization has been imposed by force on an economic, social, and legal wasteland.

"How can we control the 'forests' of shanties or the (black) market?" one Fraud Squad officer asked us, shrugging his shoulders. But what if they were to come back to us and ask, "What law or government decree governs this?"

The economy languishes, and the people tighten their belts. Where are the fruits of our "outstanding" economists, especially those with fancy academic titles and degrees? What can we call it: incompetence, bureaucracy, overhastiness with catastrophic consequences for the majority, or excessive personal profits?

#### **80-Percent Wage Payments 'Ruining' Economy**

*AU0405081792 Tirana BASHKIMI in Albanian  
9 Apr 92 p 1*

[Article by Kristo Mertiri: "Sherif Relaxes All the Day on 80 Percent of His Old Pay"]

[Text] It was a long time since I had visited the refugees' market in Tirana, where one feels a special pain at the fate of our sons and daughters beyond the seas and mountains. You can not only feel there the hand of the commonplace speculator, but also the sweat of the refugees, and it seems that sacrifice, effort, tears, and sadness haunt you at every step. The wounds of the exodus are still open. You can see goods produced in Europe and beyond. However, you can also see large quantities of goods produced in our enterprises that long ago vanished from the state market and goods fanatically hoarded in the storehouses of yesterday's retail network. A handful of wheeler-dealers are profiting and an entire people is losing, writhing in pain at inconceivable and scandalous prices. Can we go on like this? Can we go toward Europe with only a few people who cruelly profit from extreme

destitution? Such questions and quandaries strike you like a knife in every corner of the market. A Fraud Squad official says: "We only intervene over goods in the basket [of staple articles whose prices are frozen] (that has been leaking for some time). That is all the law allows...." Rack your brains as hard as you can, citizen with a thousand woes! The belts of workers and peasants are tightened to the last notch. Townspeople walk slowly, plunged in thought. And yet suddenly, there is a song (a song or an accusation?): "Sherif relaxes all the day/On 80 percent of his old pay."

In a good mood after completing his sales at the counter and totting up his daily budget, the citizen downs a double shot of brandy from the itinerant meatball seller and takes up the refrain of the song. Its moral is clear: Go in for "private trade" morning and afternoon, and do not forget to turn up at your enterprise once a month or every two weeks to sign up for your free gift of 80 percent [wage rate paid to laid-off workers]. This kind of wage is totally ruining our economy, already skin and bone. However, it is above all ruining the moral, material, professional, and even patriotic responsibility of many officials in ministries and pluralist executive committees and in our factories and combines that languish in the unprecedented fever of total paralysis. It is an 80-percent wage rate that has killed the spirit to work and plunged hundreds and thousands of families deeper into the black ocean of economic misery. The gentlemen of the Foreign Trade Ministry and of firms and private businessmen wander the Balkans, Europe, and the world.

The wonders of "strict" state and financial control have reached the point that many people go to work in Greece, Italy, and elsewhere, while receiving their normal "80 percent" in Albania. It is therefore not merely a laughing matter when someone downs a few glasses and joins in the song, "Sherif relaxes all the day/On 80 percent of his old pay." This is not merely a paradox of the market economy or an act of generosity on the part of the state's strained exchequer. Gentlemen of the parliament and the government, I ask you sincerely, how long will we listen to this "song," surrounded by the spine-chilling scenes of the black market?

### Overview of Current Political Conditions

92CH0482A Prague LISTY in Czech No 1, 1992  
pp 41-48

[Article by Jiri Slama, member of the Institute for East Europe in Munich: "Current Situation in Czechoslovakia"—first paragraph is LISTY introduction]

[Text] The author of this article, which served as a briefing paper for the FRG president during his visit to our republic, was born in 1929 in Brno. He studied chemistry and received his doctorate from the School of Economics in Prague. He took active part in planning and developing the economic reform of the sixties, and after the Soviet August intervention he emigrated; he now works as a science fellow at the Institute for East Europe in Munich. This article by Prof. Jiri Slama has something to say to our readers as well. It contains an independent, synthesized look at Czechoslovak issues, interesting even where it deals with things that to us appear self-evident.

### Economic Consequences of the Past 40 Years

The current situation in Czechoslovakia is determined both by the remote past as well as by developments during the past 50 years.

Even before the introduction of the communist system, the Czech lands were subjected to the influence of another totalitarian system—the Nazi system. In many respects the influence of this system is comparable to the influence of the communist system introduced after 1948. This applies mainly to the curtailment of individual and political liberties of the citizens and their organizations.

On the other hand, the influence of both these totalitarian systems in the economic sphere differed. During the Nazi era, market economy was not abolished but was subject to military-economic regulations. Irrespective of the seizure of the country's economic base for the benefit of the Reich and the deferment of a number of new investments and maintenance, and irrespective of the war-induced structural deformation of economic development, the economic devastation of the country during the protectorate era was not as severe as during the era of communism.

Slovakia, which on the economic side was not harnessed as much into the war machinery of the Reich, could boast a relatively high economic growth. Even the provisioning of the population at that time was much better in Slovakia than in the protectorate.

The communist economic system lived off the capital.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, a new structural orientation was set—toward East Europe and the Soviet Union, and toward heavy industry. That proved to be economically unsound. Necessary investments, primarily for infrastructure, were pushed aside and postponed, which means living at future's expense.

That is why the entire economic base in Czechoslovakia is obsolete and in disrepair.

The present new orientation of the Czechoslovak economy requires that production of many enterprises be stopped and many jobs eliminated, and this precisely at a time when resources needed to create new jobs are lacking. We must expect a high unemployment rate, about 10 to 15 percent,<sup>2</sup> even though today it stands at somewhat less than half this number.

### Sociopsychological Consequences

The communist system meant, in the first place, a drastic curtailment of citizens' freedom. The power to manage society was concentrated in the hands of a few leading functionaries.<sup>3</sup> However, during the classic Stalinist era, not even they were free, but dependent on the power center in Moscow.

This curtailment of civil liberties brought with it a radical reduction of citizens' responsibility for their own fate and the fate of the country. The curtailment of liberties affected also the economic sphere, including consumption. Measures for providing for the future, old age, illness, calamities, etc., no longer were up to the citizen but entirely in the hands of the state.

During the 40 years of communist rule more than two generations were born and brought up. These generations are marked by the totalitarian and paternalistic communist system, and from the viewpoint of a free society and a market economy, deformed.

Thus far there exists no generation that would have grown up already in the new conditions. There is a young generation that could still be changed, there is an older generation which was formed by the democratic system of the prewar era (and also, of course, by the protectorate system). The question is, to what extent and how quickly can the behavior of these various generations be changed in order to be in accord with the new democratic, political, and market system.

The need now is for people who want to be entrepreneurs, who are not afraid of taking risks and have the strength and ability to start something new. It is not necessary for a broad strata of the population to have these qualities in order to revive the market economy. A relatively small number of entrepreneurs will suffice to develop a private entrepreneurial sector.

The current transformation of the economy leads to a unique situation: many people are only now discovering their abilities and possibilities, and are achieving striking social advancement. Experience from the latest economic developments in Czechoslovakia shows that this stratum of people who think and act as entrepreneurs already exists here.

Step by step, the legislature and the new organizations and institutions are also creating the framework of conditions for entrepreneurial activity.



### Current Political Situation

In comparison with other postcommunist countries, the situation in Czechoslovakia is relatively calm and stable. This gives evidence of a high political culture and democratic maturity of the population and the political leadership.

Also remarkable is the link between the movement that opposed the communist regime during the previous decades, and the current political representation. Today's political stratum is basically composed of three groupings. One is represented by former reform communists, and the second is composed mostly of politicians who in the past were in opposition to the communist system. The third group is made up of communist and noncommunist "assimilators" from the former power structure.

Whereas the reform communists were active within the power structures before 1968 and during the period of "normalization" outside of them, the anticommunist opposition moved exclusively outside of the power structures.

It is important that Czechoslovakia now has at its disposal a number of personalities who are maintaining political stability.

In the first place today it is the President of the Republic, Czech Vaclav Havel. Havel and his actions exert a strongly integrating and stabilizing influence on the political life in Czechoslovakia. But the strength of his popularity in the country is uneven: strong in the Czech Republic and relatively weak in Slovakia. One of the weaknesses of the political elite in Czechoslovakia is the fact that none of the Czech politicians enjoy sufficient support in Slovakia, and vice versa.

Another important political figure is Slovak Alexander Dubcek. Together with the other Slovak, Marian Calfa, he is one of the few federal politicians who enjoy a relatively strong support in Slovakia. However, Alexander Dubcek, because of his communist past, is politically quite controversial, particularly in the Czech Republic. That, of course, is not only Dubcek's problem, but the main problem of relations to the reform communists and the democratic left in Czechoslovakia.

The prototype of the next group of politicians is the Federal Minister of Finance and Chairman of the Civic Democratic Party, Czech Vaclav Klaus. Havel symbolizes primarily the opposition movement during the so-called normalization. Alexander Dubcek is a symbol of the attempt by reform communists to reform the communist system. Vaclav Klaus, who is 50 years old, was never a member of the Communist Party. Neither was Klaus involved intensively in the opposition movement during normalization. But during the period of normalization he accomplished a great deal by training a group of economists, who are today playing an important role in the current transformation of the Czechoslovak economy.

As was already indicated, Czechoslovakia today—the same as other postcommunist countries—is pervaded by a strong anticommunist mood which does its work under the name debolshevization. It is understandable and must be judged positively, because it makes the task of removing and overcoming the elements of the communist system easier. In many people, however, this anti-communist attitude is only superficial and does not include either an understanding of the problem of a deeply rooted communist approach to the issues of economy and society, or a clear idea about how to overcome these residues. Instead of being aimed at overcoming the communist system, this anticommunist attitude limits itself to simply judging individual politicians according to whether they used to be members of the Communist Party. As a consequence of this attitude reform communists are placed on the same level as their tormentors...the "normalizing" dogmatists.

The general opposition to communism is unfortunately carried over to everything "socialist" and "leftist." Quite often even the liberal, or left liberal, trend is not spared. The mood is such that many politicians think that they can ride the antileftist horse to a certain political success.

In addition, a certain distortion of basic political concepts can be observed on the Czechoslovak political scene. A liberal is quickly dismissed as a leftist liberal, and what in West European economy and politics is understood as a free liberal is called rightist in Czechoslovakia.

The crowd on the right end of the political spectrum is great, and individual parties are downright denying each other's rightist position. The concept "rightist position" is not, however, linked in Czechoslovakia with those attributes that are known from West Europe, such as, for example, nationalism, xenophobia, leaning toward a strong and authoritarian state. Vaclav Klaus' party, which describes itself as a party of the conservative right, could be compared more to the Free Democratic Party in the Federal Republic of Germany.

In Czechoslovakia, at present and after the foiled putsch in the Soviet Union, discussions about banning the Communist Party are taking place with more intensity than ever before.

The experience in Western democracies shows that the Communist Party must strictly observe the constitution and laws as a precondition for being allowed to carry on its activities. A ban on the Communist Party, particularly in view of the large number of communist voters, could mean abridgment of democracy. The development of democracy in Czechoslovakia is not threatened, at least not at this time, by this party. But it cannot be overlooked that the Communist Party, experienced in presenting simple demands, will try to exploit to its advantage especially those social problems and conflicts that the economic transformation will bring with it as it



progresses. However, the threat from populist policy of this kind will not be limited only to the Communist Party.

The bad experience with communism is also manifested in the aversion to other leftist and socialist trends. Many politicians from the so-called right disregard the fact that parties of left liberalism and democratic socialism must play an important role in the democratic development of a society, as even Western experiences prove. In Czechoslovakia the leftist parties are still too weak to be able to play this important role.

The mentioned problems differentiate even the standing of the successor parties of the Civic Forum. The Civic Forum (in Slovakia this party is called Public Against Violence) won overwhelmingly in the last parliamentary elections. Both parties are represented in the parliaments accordingly. But this Civic Forum *de facto* does not exist any more. This gives rise to an anomalous situation, which under other conditions would have to lead to a dissolution of the parliaments and a call for new elections. But such a solution would be ill-considered, if only because new parliamentary elections will take place soon. Nevertheless, problems that were behind the breakup of the Civic Forum remain in the form of problems of the successor parties.

#### Disputes About the Concept of Economic Reform

Intense controversy about the transformation of the Czechoslovak economy went on throughout 1990.<sup>4</sup> This controversy was waged mainly between groups of government economists, who were supported by many publicists and scientists, and their opponents, particularly from economic institutes and schools of higher learning, from the ranks of the opposition parties (for example, the Communist Party), and small parties not represented in the parliament. Among the critics were even some politicians and experts from the government coalition (Milos Zeman, Valtr Komarek). Even the number one man of the Czechoslovak economic reform of the sixties, Professor Ota Sik (in exile in St. Gallen, Switzerland) was one of the opponents.

This controversy was not about whether a market economy should be introduced at all, but rather about the form, content, and speed of this process. Opponents of the government's conception were refuted not only by pertinent arguments, but were even denounced on political grounds: as socialists and leftists, and as proponents of the so-called third way.

After the implementation of the key elements of the economic transformation on January 1, 1991, the controversy about its conception died down. But the controversy about evaluating the progress of the economy continues. The government evaluates the progress by and large positively, whereas its opponents speak about a catastrophic crisis and demand a thorough revision of its conception or even a retreat from the reform.

The government expected a severe decline in production in 1991, a short-term jump in prices at the beginning of the year, decline in domestic demand, and a rapid increase in unemployment. It also expected price increases to level off soon.

The crisis in marketing and a weakened demand forces many enterprises into entrepreneurial activity; that is a necessary part of the painful recovery process. And that is the point where the views of the authors of the economic reform and their critics differ. The critics are sounding the alarm and are painting the future of Czechoslovak economy in the blackest of colors. They do not take into consideration the fact that the crisis is first and foremost the result of the dark legacy of 40 years of communist rule.

The fight over the reform is linked to the current political struggle in Czechoslovakia.<sup>5</sup> Although everybody is in favor of market economy, many are not prepared to permit the serious social consequences resulting from its introduction. In the economic teams of all three governments there is almost nobody who would underestimate the social consequences and aspects of market economy. But it must be kept in mind that precisely now, during the process of the transformation, the consequences of introducing the market economy cannot be understood the same way as in a market economy which is already functioning and rich. Most of the critics of the political reform therefore come from the left wing of the political spectrum.

#### Economic Transformation—Goals and Results

The main elements of the economic transformation in Czechoslovakia can be formulated as follows:

- Creating a new legal institutional framework for the market economy.
- Price liberalization on the domestic market.
- Commercialization, demonopolization, and privatization of industry.
- Convertibility of the Czechoslovak koruna [Kcs].
- Creating a social network.
- Restrictive monetary and fiscal policy on the macroeconomic level.

In Czechoslovakia, important steps toward a functioning market economy together with a stabilizing macroeconomic course were taken in a relatively short time. The reform goals which have been reached thus far are:

- The conditions for joint ventures with a direct foreign participation in current Czechoslovak entrepreneurial activities are more favorable.
- The state monopoly on foreign trade is gone.
- Following several devaluations of the koruna, a limited (for commercial transactions) internal convertibility was introduced.
- A considerable part of the subsidies to state enterprises was abolished.

- The structural changes made thus far in the state and cooperative economic sectors have already accomplished that the number of economic organizations has risen, and that at the same time the average size of enterprises has been reduced. The number of state economic organizations grew by about 51 percent, and cooperative organizations by 15 percent. This reorganization has had an extremely strong impact on the construction industry, where the number of enterprises more than doubled.
- The Czechoslovak parliament in the meantime passed a law on economic competition and a law on bankruptcy. This created legal bases for changing the monopolistic structures, which thus far have been firmly entrenched in various industrial branches.
- At the beginning of 1991, with the freeing of most retail prices and the exchange rate, the main phase of the reform began. Since then, other price regulations have been removed.
- The small privatization of restaurants, shops, and other small places of business began at the end of January 1991, the large privatization of medium and large state enterprises is taking place at present. In the latter case the controversial coupon method is being used as well. The share of foreign participation in the privatization is supposed to reach, according to estimates, 30 to 40 percent.

#### Economic Development Between January and July 1991

Data are available on the development of the economy in the first seven months of 1991. These data show the working of the key measures of the economic transformation which were introduced in 1990, and especially in January 1 1991.

The marketing difficulties of the Czechoslovak economy on both the domestic and foreign markets continue.

Industrial production, including small enterprises in the private sector, fell by 22 percent in comparison with July 1990, and by 17.7 percent for the period January to July 1991 in comparison with the same period of the preceding year. The decline was higher in industrial enterprises with more than 100 employees.

A similar development took place in the construction industry. Decline of production in July 1991 in comparison with July 1990: 20.5 percent; for January to July 1991 in comparison with the same period of the preceding year: 27.9 percent.

Unemployment increased as well. On 31 July 1991 there were 363,000 unemployed, that is 20.6 percent more than the preceding month. The rate of unemployment therefore represents 4.6 percent of the total existing work force.

The number of unemployed and the rate of unemployment in Czechoslovakia were greatly differentiated. In the Czech Republic the rate of unemployment was 3.1 percent, in the Slovak Republic 7.7 percent.

In comparison with the former GDR, the rate of unemployment in Czechoslovakia is very much lower. This is related to the fact that the transformation of the Czechoslovak economy is proceeding at a slower pace than does this process in the former GDR. It corresponds unequivocally to the different conditions within the framework of the transformation in these two countries.

Among the most positive influences of the transformation of the Czechoslovak economy thus far is the development of the prices of Czechoslovak goods and of the exchange rate. In both these areas stability was achieved very quickly following the liberalization at the beginning of this year. This is evident in the growth of retail prices in comparison with the preceding months: January: plus 25.8 percent, February: plus 7 percent, March: plus 4.7 percent, April: plus 2 percent, May: plus 1.9 percent, June: plus 1.8 percent, and July: minus 0.1 percent.

This development is also an indicator that Czechoslovakia has already done away with the kind of market that is controlled by supply, and that it at last achieved the desired kind of market where the situation is determined by demand.

The exchange rate of the koruna became balanced as well, without massive interventions of the state bank. The goal, total convertibility of the koruna, came much closer.

#### On the Future of the Federation of Czechs and Slovaks

At the present time, fierce arguments are taking place in Czechoslovakia about the preservation of the common state and its inner structure, or about the possible creation of two independent national states.

Not only the recent, but also the more remote past of both nations and both parts of the country, that is, the Czech lands and Slovakia, were very different, but nevertheless have much in common.

Thus far, both nations have lived for only a short time in an independent state. The Czechs had their own state for several centuries during the Middle Ages, the Slovaks' own state came into being—apart from the Great Moravian Empire (830-906)—only in the 20th century, in the form of the Czechoslovak Republic. But many Slovaks thought of this state as their own only conditionally.

Both nations lived for centuries under foreign hegemony. Neither nation had its own upper, or ruling, class. Both nations therefore had a tendency to oppose the ruling class and a tendency toward a rudimentary democratic stance. Such conception of democracy is more developed in the Czech lands, where it is based on older traditions, particularly the Hussite movement and later the workers' movement.

Czech and Slovak are two independent languages. The Czech literary language originated in the Middle Ages, the Slovak literary language only in the last century. The

difference in the word supply, pronunciation, and grammatical structure in Czech and Slovak are barely greater than between two Bavarian dialects.

Whereas Slovakia has been noted for agriculture and was industrialized only recently, since long ago, industrialization has been the characteristic of the Czech lands.

Slovak national aspirations were satisfied less often throughout history than the Czech aspirations. The Slovak aspirations to be a nation only found fulfillment during the Nazi rule and in connection with it, precisely at a time when the Czechs lost their national independence and were forcefully integrated into the Nazi Reich as a protectorate.

Whereas the Czechs have a tendency toward a nonreligious stance, in Slovakia a minority Protestant and a predominant Catholic religiosity holds sway, almost as strong as that in neighboring Poland.<sup>6</sup>

Czechs have a strong tradition of the workers' movement. The majority of social democrats and socialists joined the Communist Party following World War I.

In Slovakia communists were relatively strong before the war (1935—11.8 percent), not, however, among the Slovaks but among the poorest strata of the Hungarian inhabitants, above all among the agricultural workers in the large estates in Southern Slovakia.<sup>7</sup> Slovak communists, in view of their social status on the fringes of society in comparison with the Czech communists, were more radical and also more devoted to the Soviet Union.

As a consequence of this situation, in the free elections in 1946 communists in the Czech lands won, whereas in Slovakia they were defeated.

Where communism spread only a little in the thirties and forties—therefore among the Slovaks—there also the reform communism sank few roots during the sixties. While the Czechs fought during the Prague Spring for freedom and democracy and a "civic society," in Slovakia the most important demand was national self-determination, which as a consequence of the Prague Spring found satisfaction in October 1968 in the form of the Czechoslovak federation, even though it had a totalitarian content.

Even the course of "normalization" was of different intensity in both countries.

Whereas a considerable number of Slovaks and their politicians became considerably enmeshed in fascism and Nazism, the Czechs fared similarly in communism and reform communism. But the support for the Slovak state in Slovakia was by no means unanimous. That was proven in 1944 by the Slovak National Uprising, the goal of which was opposition to that state and the restoration of the Czechoslovak republic.

The controversy about the Slovak state is still going on today. Many Slovak politicians are not immune in their nationalistic efforts to the semifascist form of the then

Slovak state. At the same time, the tendency to rehabilitate and glorify the Slovak state is getting strong support from abroad. That is because in the West, particularly in Germany, the United States, and Canada, there is a strong group of politicians and partisans of the Slovak state.<sup>8</sup>

The Communist Party enjoys a relatively strong position in both parts of the country. That became obvious last year during the parliamentary elections, when communists in both parts of the country received more than 13 percent of the votes.

The causes of the misfortunes that have afflicted one or the other partner must most likely be sought—as it is with any problem—on both sides. The Slovaks have an inferiority complex vis-a-vis the Czechs. The Czech arrogance lies in, if in nothing else, the fact that this complex is not taken seriously and only soothing words offered, and it therefore provokes.

A unitary, as a rule one-nation, state undoubtedly has many advantages over a federation based on the ethnic principle, mainly when it concerns administration and the economy. And at the same time such a state can be quite decentralized—with a real and far-reaching autonomy of regions and communities. Although such a democratic, decentralized state is thinkable even in a multinational society, it probably is hardly viable on the basis of nations and nationalities that are deeply at odds and distrustful of each other. And that is precisely the situation where Czechoslovakia finds itself today. The first common task of the Czech as well as Slovak politicians is the preservation of the common state, because it is advantageous for all citizens. But not against the will of the nations; then the advantages would disappear. In my opinion, the intensity of the tendencies toward a breakup has diminished and has already passed its zenith. The next task on behalf of the federation should proceed under the following slogans: a genuine right to act, instead of mere formalities; end to unitarist remnants in thinking and practice; end to the stepmother approach to the powers of the federation; intensive decentralization and regionalization, not, of course, on an ethnic basis but rather on the basis of other criteria, particularly economic.

It would be unfortunate if both nations had to live through a practical experience with independence in order to appreciate the value of coexistence.

#### **Problem of Reconciliation Between Germans and Czechs**

On both sides<sup>9</sup> it is often said: A settling of accounts between Germans and Czechs for the crimes, suffering, the dead, and, after all, even property losses could never be adequate or even possible. But quietly, inadvertently or even consciously, it is taking place nevertheless. Reasons for it lie, after all, also in the course and linkup of individual historical phases, historical successions of action and reaction, the old and the new state of affairs.



The wrongs that Germans and Czechs did to each other, have, following two relatively calm phases, developed into dreadful crimes:

- Phase No. 1: Conditions in the monarchy: hegemony of Austrian Germans in the monarchy and the historic lands, Czechs' unsuccessful struggle for equality of nationalities.
- Phase No. 2 (reaction): Conditions in the Czechoslovak republic: hegemony of the Czechs to the detriment of the Germans. The development of German rejection of the Czechoslovak state from the German "activist" share in the government up to the Nazi-colored rejection of this state by the Sudeten German Party and the great majority of the German population.
- Phase No. 3 (reaction?): The destruction of Czechoslovakia by Hitler with the help of the Sudeten Germans as an exploited instrument and the establishment of the protectorate: 6 years of brutal German rule over the Czechs with the help of the Sudeten Germans.
- Phase No. 4 (reaction): Brutal expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia.<sup>10</sup>

This is roughly how the historical-political settlement could look, which shows the course of events and their context. Is it acceptable by both sides? and if not, what are the reasons?

Is a legal settlement, a juristic grasp of the events, possible at all? I think that a juristic determination of the events is on the whole not possible, and that an attempt to define at least some of these moments of committed crimes juridically must be supplemented by an exposition of the historical and political context of those events.

Of the thousand-year-long history of the coexistence of Germans and Czechs in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia there are in fact only two chapters that stand out by the extraordinary extent and heinousness of the crimes committed: the crimes committed on the Czechs between 1938-45, and the crimes committed on the Germans between 1945-47. These two chapters can be compared without constantly taking into consideration the previous times: the discrimination against the Czechs in the monarchy and against the Germans in prewar Czechoslovakia.

The wrongs and crimes committed against the Czechs during the Nazi rule are considered to be worse, because it was a terror intended and planned for a long time, carried out consciously as a policy of violence against an "inferior nation" and as a policy of its enslavement.

The Czech crimes include the expulsion, which was sanctioned by the victorious powers, and crimes committed during the expulsion. For those crimes there was no legal basis and they are unforgivable. But it must be added that the Czech crimes should be understood more as a reaction to the wrongs done to them by the Germans earlier.

#### Current Attitude of Czechs Toward the Germans and Germany

Today, the Czechs' attitude toward the Germans appears to be worse than in the last years of the communist dictatorship. Among the population at that time there was only appreciation for the West German successes in all areas, in inverse proportion to the intensity of the anti-West German propaganda. The anti-Czech voices from the Federal Republic of Germany that were publicized were dismissed by the people in communist Czechoslovakia as communist propaganda. The German whipping boy, in contrast to the regime's propaganda, became the hated GDR.

This attitude was superimposed in the Czech minds over the strong and deeply rooted dislike of the Germans, which has its origins in the past. It is not the result of the past communist propaganda! That was ineffective. On the contrary, the communist propaganda succeeded not in mobilizing this dislike but in suppressing it for a time.

Today, when Czech politicians are trying for a reconciliation with the Germans and admit to Czech crimes, such as the expulsion and the crimes connected with it, all the hatred and mistrust of the Czech population of the Germans is coming to the surface.<sup>11</sup>

And this does not concern only the older generation. Even in the younger generation, on which the past weighs only a little, an anti-German attitude is beginning to develop. Envy probably plays a large role in this. A negative role is also played by the behavior of people from the former GDR. It is not the rich western Germans who excel in arrogant behavior, but the nouveaux riches from eastern Germany [the former GDR].

The fear of the expansion of German capital is also very widespread. But that is only partially a problem of German-Czech relations. What is actually behind it is the left-animating antipathy toward capital as such. People do not correctly understand how today's internationalized market economy works and what the foundations of its successes are. But maybe such dislikes will be quickly overcome by practical experience and education.

Between World War I and World War II, Germany played a decisive role in Czechoslovak foreign trade relations. Even during the era of the Nazi regime, during the first half of the thirties. And even despite Czechoslovak policies which favored France.

An important role in the development of Czechoslovak-German economic relations was played by Sudeten Germans as Czechoslovak citizens. Today, they can as German citizens support from the outside the CSFR contacts with the West, especially with Germany. The planned treaty could certainly be of help in this. It would make no sense if the drafting of the treaty and negotiations about it were to escalate the antagonisms between the two parties to the treaty, rather than providing another step toward reconciliation.



**Footnotes**

1. Depreciation of older equipment (for example, in the textile or food industry) was not used for reconditioning this equipment but for building branches of heavy industry, for example, heavy machinery and iron smelting. This is what is meant by "living at future's expense."

2. The unemployment rate in the former GDR in August 1991 was 12 percent, in Czechoslovakia in July 1991 it was 4.6 percent.

3. After the seizure of power, these were real politicians, even though of the Stalinist stripe (Gottwald, Zapotocky); they were used to moving in the political arena of the parliamentary democracy of prewar Czechoslovakia, and address broad masses with demagogic social demands. Later they were no longer politicians but merely party bureaucrats, such as Novotny and Jakes. Husak was a kind of exception.

4. The term "transformation" is more in accord with the depth of the social process than the term "economic reform."

5. Parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia will probably be held in June 1992. But the preelection struggle already began several months ago.

6. The reason lies probably in the forced re-Catholicization of Czechs after the defeat of the reformation and the Thirty Years' War, and in the fact that Czechs considered the status of the Catholic Church during the monarchy as a barrier to their national aspirations. The attitude of the population to religions, especially to the Catholic Church, in Bohemia has improved during the past 20 years, thanks to their opposition to the communist regime. Moravia, on the other hand, has been traditionally more religious-minded than Bohemia, and lies, not just geographically, but also as far as religion is concerned, between Bohemia and Slovakia.

7. This situation was much more pronounced in the poorer Ruthenia, where the communists became the strongest party in several elections in prewar Czechoslovakia.

8. The powerful wave of efforts to clear the Slovak state came quite unexpectedly after the overthrow of the communist regime. Obviously it was made possible only thanks to the massive support from abroad. This campaign began immediately after the November revolution.

9. It is not by accident that the relations between Slovaks and Germans are not mentioned here. Only 5 percent of the German population of Czechoslovakia lived in Slovakia.

10. The fact that the expulsion is considered to be an immoral and even a criminal act, but also a reaction, does not in itself substantiate a legal identification of the expulsion as a crime. This verdict is based on the

legitimization of the expulsion by the Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945, according to which the transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia was to be made in a "legal and humane way."

11. When shortly after the revolution—in January 1990—I published in *LIDOVE NOVINY* an article about the negative consequences which the expulsion of Germans had for Czechoslovakia, I received a number of letters from readers who mostly defended the expulsion.

**Newly Announced Energy Policy Reviewed**

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[Article by Tomas Skrdlant: "The Nucleus of Our Future: What Is Missing in the Principles of the State Energy Policy"]

[Text] Even in a market society energy should probably have a different position than other production. Producing it is not just a goal, but a means to an end. The Principles of the State Energy Policy approved by the Federal Government shortly before Christmas speaks of the ecological burden of supplying energy with a particular eye toward environmental protection, of the state's participation in the programs of ecological investments, of ecologically clean technologies and improvement of the environment, of respecting the ecological viewpoint, etc. The concepts of ecology and the environment appear in them a total of nine times, but the Principles is only apparently ecologically oriented.

In the abstract phrases of the official language of the document I was not able to decipher even an indication of some kind of insurance, a negative reverse relationship stimulating and making more advantageous the lower consumption, and also lower production, of energy. Increasing the prices of energy forces only the consumer to conserve. But the relationship between him and the producer remains a constantly positive market one and the producer has no reason to be happy with lower consumption or, in the final analysis, to reward it. How is it that the Principles does not consider at all the methods of integrated planning of sources (the so-called least-cost planning) which put the producer and the consumer in the same boat as far as their interests are concerned, so that both profit from savings and, on the other hand, both lose with higher production and consumption? This is an approach tested in practice in the United States.

Supposedly in this country by the year 2000 the consumption of coal for energy will drop by at least 35 percent, the production of coal-fired power plants will be reduced to about 40 percent of the current level, and the production of electrical energy at nuclear power plants will increase to 50 percent of the overall production of electricity. This sounds like the central planning from the time of the five-year plans. The Principles declares its subordination to market principles and an extensive privatization of energy, but on the other hand presumes structural changes leading to savings (unfortunately it

does not indicate what should lead the private producers of energy to actually reduce their production) and even improvements in the environment.

The language in which the Principles is written reveals something else, however. Long-winded sentences full of "regarding, thoroughly respecting, prerequisites for implementation of the basic strategy and rights over energy sources," and such pearls of official Czech language at times does allow some information to pass through which is specific and unambiguous.

Thus only with the most optimistic of prerequisite conditions is it possible to consider that the demand for electrical energy in 2000 would exceed the current consumption by up to 10 percent. There are countries where they are considering by how many tens of percent the consumption of electricity will decline in the upcoming decades if they introduce more efficient appliances and apply least-cost planning. For whom, then, is the federal forecast optimistic other than for the market producer of energy, pleased with any profit that he makes? If this position is the basis for the federal energy policy, then it would be more honest to get rid of this ecologizing terminology. It only acts as a sop to the current trends.

The principle set out of "fully including the expenses of storing radioactive waste in the production costs of nuclear power plants" is indeed correct, but it cannot be implemented since to date the final storage of such wastes has not been resolved anywhere in the world and the estimates of the costs for it differ by up to two orders of magnitude. It would thus be more honest to say that we will leave this debt deliberately to the next generation. And this is far from just a financial debt.

Here as well the evasive language betrays its authors when they consider how "to gain time for a qualified decision on final storage of spent fuel." The transitive indefinite form of the verbal pronoun gives one the sense of a subconscious uncertainty or the author's doubt as to whether it is at all possible somehow to find "permanent" storage for the spent fuel or at the very least confirms our suspicion that the construction of more nuclear power plants is being considered, rather than not being.

Right after that, we can read the most striking sentence of the entire Principles: "In a case where it is not possible or economical to export the spent fuel or products from its processing abroad, it will be necessary to build a permanent underground storage site for highly radioactive wastes or spent fuel." This information is tossed out in passing where it should have at least a separate paragraph devoted to it, to the fact that we are not excluding the construction of an extensive and highly risky industry for processing spent fuel. Why this inconspicuous treatment? In Germany the construction of such a plant was stopped by public pressure and in Great Britain the same industry caused the closure of 40

kilometers of shoreline (at Sellafield) and the radioactivity there reaches up to a thousand times the natural amount.

Man has created various good and bad things with which he has for a long time marked the face of the earth. But no human creation is as indestructible or long-lasting as the radioactive waste which is created in nuclear power plants. Even if humanity died out and nature returned back into all its lands and even if an earthquake destroyed all kinds of life on earth, for 90,000 years there would still persist this unremovable deadly material which man has produced in the tens of thousands of tons and has scattered over the entire planet. Do we want to continue this? Do we know of any containers that we are sure will remain tight for tens of thousands of years? Do we know of any place about whose tectonic, climatic, and hydrological permanence and immutability we can be sure for a period exceeding any kind of our historical experience? The United States Department of Energy has spent over two billion dollars just in searching for such a stable and safe storage place all over the United States. They did not find one! This is one of the reasons why since 1978 there has not been a single additional nuclear power plant ordered. "Our federal democratic system makes the revival of nuclear energy very difficult," says I.C. Bupp, the director of the Cambridge Energy Research Society.

And we also have to look for a storage site; the Principles is right about that. But there is a difference in whether we are trying to use it to get rid of the consequences of the communist past or if we will fill it up and expand it in the future as well. Just how does the predicted 50 percent share in the production of electricity after 2000 go together with the declared privatization and market relationships? Throughout the world it can be seen that nuclear energy cannot be privatized and is not profitable when market relationships are applied. This is one of the reasons for the worldwide trend away from it and this is the source of 40 billion dollars of debt which has been taken on in France, which is stubbornly sticking with nuclear power plants. Why does the World Bank now not offer credits for the construction of nuclear power plants? Because there are agents of Greenpeace in the management or because they are good businessmen there?

Are we going to drive downhill without an engine even though we know that the brakes on our car fail from time to time? The attitude of the government toward nuclear energy is roughly that once we have something, then it would be a shame to get out of it. Obviously it does not bother to ask the fellow passengers.

"The federal government considers the production of electricity and heat at nuclear power plants as acceptable," it says in this Principles, which has already been approved by the Federal Government. But even a year ago Marian Calfa had a different opinion of the method of making decisions. In a discussion for British television, he said, "We must submit this concept of a further

approach to the people. We must ask them so that either they accept the development of atomic energy at the price of a reduction in burning brown coal or, if they prefer, we will simply continue down the path of improving the burning of brown coal and stop atomic energy. We need a clear answer from our people on this. Nobody can set this up so that I would say to myself that we do not need a corporate decision; it is necessary for all the people to decide on this."

But a corporate body has been found and it has taken the responsibility on itself. Should its chairman not also be responsible? To answer and to explain why it is now not "necessary for all the people to decide on this"? The question in any eventual later referendum would now only have to ask: "Am I for a growth of over one-half in the share of nuclear power plants in this country or against it?" And this is probably not the basic decision which should be made about nuclear energy.

I am not angry, nor do I wonder, about the fact that we do not have an ecologically enlightened government. Other than New Guinea, the governments of only a few small northern countries have matured to that point through a long democratic process. I do not fully understand why it has happened in those countries, but I think that I do understand well why it has not happened here. The other extreme of a long-term swing of the pendulum is carrying us toward a society which is fervently and fascinatedly pursuing a market orientation and toward the acquisition of goods and material prosperity as a goal which is attractive above all others and to where even freedom is finally only a tool or a vehicle. And thus the government as well, expressing the opinion of its people, directs its efforts to free up the path for constantly greater production of a constantly greater number of objects of constantly more artificial materials with a constantly shorter lifespan for a constantly growing number of people who constantly know less whether they need everything which is offered to them or whether everything is offered to them so that they will believe that they need it. Nonetheless, they constantly want more, even at the price of constantly greater illness, but mainly at a price which they will for the most part not pay, but will pass on to their children's children.

It is probably not possible to skip over stages of development and it is necessary to take a certain deeper look at the facts. How can this be done? It strikes me that it should also be ecological, a quiet and observant study of the environment which (at least for now) makes it possible for us to live. The natural ecosystems show us the best energy policy; the more mature that they are, the less they waste, the less energy they consume per unit of biomass. An example of such a system would be a forest. Not the spruce monoculture in which we produce wood, but a true, natural forest. In the course of its development it learned to utilize energy better and better, mainly by the variety and hierarchy of trophic levels by which this flow of energy progressively flows. Everything is connected into a cycle, no waste collects, the input of nutrients is minimal, but its circulation is rapid and

intensive. In keeping with this, the primary production of plants per unit of biomass also is reduced. Nonetheless, the biomass increases, the system prospers, because it becomes more complex and denser. In such highly organized systems the quantity of energy stored between the input and the output also increases. "That is the general law of life," deduces Harold J. Morowitz in his study of energy flows in biology, "Energy Flow in Biology."

In contrast to people, trees do not have heads and a forest does not have its government. It must therefore mature gradually and as a whole. I still believe that in a human society the government is its head which will soon mature and decide which way growth should go.

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T. Skrdlant, born in 1943, is a publisher, the author of films on ecological themes, and a coworker of the magazine NIKA.

### Causes of Unemployment in Slovakia Reported

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[Commentary by Miroslav Singer: "Thirteen Percent Unemployment—Can Inflation Help Slovakia?"]

[Text] According to statistics, Slovakia has unemployment three times greater than does the Czech Republic (12.74 percent as compared to 4.31 percent). Such a difference cannot be easily explained. One comparison that is offered, however, is with the former GDR, where after currency unification, in many branches of the economy which are found here, the wages increased above the level that makes it possible to produce with profit. A sharp growth in unemployment resulted, which was further strengthened by senselessly generous unemployment benefits.

### A Lot of Money for Little Work

Slovakia apparently avoided this sharp currency revaluation (increase in value). On the contrary, at the beginning of the new year the Czechoslovak koruna was devaluated. But the price liberalization and the arrival of a market system demonstrated something that no one expected. Even after 40 years of massive redistribution of resources from the Czech lands, the Slovak economy is much weaker than the Czech. The socialist planners simply were not able to utilize the resources effectively.

The low productivity of the SR [Slovak Republic] economy does not correspond to the level of pay there. The situation is made all the worse (just as in the former GDR) by the generous social policies of the Slovak government. Slovakia simply has too high wages and unemployment compensation and too low productivity of labor in comparison with the CR [Czech Republic] and thus is not able to compete with it.

If the Slovak government wants to reduce unemployment, it must lower wages. However, wages are often

inflexible in the downward direction; the social aspects of reducing wages makes it practically impossible. It is clear that a reduction in wages is very improbable in a Slovakia which is already disquieted. In such a situation, the recommendation, mainly by Keynesian economists, is to manage inflation, which would make it possible to lower the real wages without excessive social tensions. As far as the Slovak economists who are calling for an expansive currency policy are taking this into consideration, they are right.

#### **Controlled Inflation Has Not Worked**

Unfortunately, the results of 1991 clearly show that even under conditions of last year's relatively high inflation, wages in Slovakia increased at the same rate as in the Czech lands. The SR government was simply not able to prevent this, so that the attempt at controlled inflation did not lead to an inflationary spiral. If making Slovakia independent brought with it the agreement of the Slovak trade unions and workers to freeze wages even under inflationary conditions, motivated by national pride in

their own state, such a development would be in the interest of the Slovak economy.

Inflation is not in the interest of the Czech Republic. An unemployment rate of 4 percent is not a reason to change the course of currency policy taken. It is indeed true that this has not yet led to the bankruptcy of the unprofitable enterprises, after which the level of unemployment will certainly increase, but it also has not had to exceed the socially acceptable limit. It is perhaps not even necessary to mention the negative consequences of inflation as such (a reduction in the security of long-term investments, not attracting foreign investors, etc.).

It is thus a matter of a conflict in the interests of the Czech and Slovak policies which could possibly be resolved by the breakup of Czechoslovakia. It is, of course, a question of whether the populist spokesmen for an independent Slovakia are capable of thinking in a similar manner and if their voters are willing to accept a decline in the standard of living caused by inflation in place of the promised economic upturn.



**Zetenyi Equates Nazi, Communist Crimes**

92CH0497A Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian  
31 Mar 92 pp 6-7

[Interview with Zsolt Zetenyi, parliamentary representative of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, and Laszlo Donath, a Lutheran pastor, by Gyorgy Nej; place and date not given: "Jesus Contra Zetenyi—Who Can Be Forgiven? When the Law Turns Against Itself"—first paragraph is 168 ORA introduction]

[Excerpt] Our critics often call us a nation of would-be lawyers. The many legal discussions of the last week are, thus, not without historical precedent. This is one of the reasons why the recent conference with the title "Pluralism and Tolerance" generated great interest. Two participants in the conference, Zsolt Zetenyi, the well-known parliamentary representative of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], and Laszlo Donath, Lutheran pastor, were interviewed by Gyorgy Nej.

[Nej] Since this was a conference with the title "Pluralism and Tolerance," one would have expected Zsolt Zetenyi also to have mentioned the law named after him and his fellow representative, Mr. Takacs. However, you engaged rather in historical analysis and did not devote more than half a minute to this law.

[Zetenyi] Indeed, I did not spend much time on it, but I pointed out the essence of it [as published]. I mentioned my meeting with a representative of the Wiesenthal Center. He was very interested in the situation of Hungarian Jewry and wanted me to supply him with information about individuals who could be called on by a delegation visiting Hungary. At the time we hinted—and I mentioned it explicitly at the conference as well—that although the holocaust, or rather more precisely, war crimes and crimes against humanity, are not subject to the statute of limitations, the crimes of the communists, committed later in time, can no longer be punished. One must expect tensions in this area, because one kind of rule cannot be applied to one segment of the population and another kind to another.

**Bank of the Danube and Kossuth Square**

[Nej] Is it not the case that international law prescribes that war crimes and crimes against humanity are not subject to the statute of limitations, while there are no such international treaties concerning another segment of the population, the communists?

[Zetenyi] One cannot say that an international treaty is a legal source of a higher status; one cannot make distinctions of any kind about the value of human lives. This is a constitutional issue; namely, the principle of the equality of citizens before the law. A basic constitutional principle is violated. If, let us say, someone was shot into the Danube in 1944, his murderer can still be punished, but if someone was riddled with bullets in 1956 on Kossuth Square, his murderer cannot be punished.

[Nej] Why did the representative of the Wiesenthal Center seek out you of all people in order to obtain information on persons who did much to protect Jews in recent times? How do you or how can you have knowledge of them?

[Zetenyi] They asked me for information on individuals who can report on the situation and legal protection of Hungarian Jewry. I am the secretary of the parliamentary Committee on Human Rights. This has nothing to do with my activities on the statute of limitations. What they want to know is whether undesirable tensions could perhaps develop within the population.

[Nej] In your opinion, toward whom, or in whose case, is there a lack of tolerance?

[Zetenyi] Tolerance and patience are moral concepts, and I cannot specify groups of the population toward whom there is a lack of tolerance in comparison with others.

[Nej] However, precisely this is what happened in the proposed legislation named after you. In your opinion, what connection is there between indictability and patience?

[Zetenyi] None. The necessity of punishing murderers is not a question of patience, but rather a basic moral and legal principle. The protection of human lives has been a commandment from the Old Testament to diverse international treaties—in which, by the way, Hungary is also a participant. Thus, whether crimes are punished cannot be a question of choice, of deliberation. This is a complete fallacy.

**The Commandment of Punishment**

[Nej] Thus, crime must be punished?

[Zetenyi] Yes, it is a commandment to punish it.

[Nej] Under any circumstances?

[Zetenyi] Of course. The Hungarian penal codes, that is to say, the laws of punitive sanctions, have prescribed this duty for the state for the past 110 years.

[Nej] This is undoubtedly true, but you are a lawyer and so you know that the state can and does pass legislation to restrict its own power. And in the area of law, the statute of limitations is such a self-restricting institution.

[Zetenyi] Not only I, but renowned experts also dispute this. You can go to all those holding a chair of criminal law in Hungary, you can ask Professor Imre Bekes, Professor Jozsef Foldvary, or Ferenc Nagy in Szeged whether it is a fact that these crimes have become subject to the statute of limitations. You will be surprised to hear that their opinion is not exactly identical with that of the Constitutional Court.

[Nej] Laszlo Donath, a Lutheran pastor, also participated in this learned conference. What is your opinion about the fact that while war crimes and crimes against

humanity are not subject to the statute of limitations, the grave crimes committed by communists are regarded to be beyond the statute of limitations in Hungary at the present time?

[Donath] There is an enormous difference here. There are international agreements regarding Nazi war crimes and crimes against humanity that are accepted by the punitive legislation of individual nations. There is no concept of "the crimes of communism." One can talk about Stalinism, about the Rakosi era or about the Kadar era, and divide them in turn into periods, but it is singularly senseless to lump these people together, because it is well known that Janos Kadar was imprisoned by Matyas Rakosi's circle, and it would be absurd to talk about the communist crimes of communists against communists.

[Nej] In your opinion, how tolerant can law be? How tolerant can criminal law be? To what degree can categories like tolerance and forgiveness be linked to law and to legal practice at all?

[Donath] At the moment that the law begins to worship itself and thinks that it can solve such basic conflicts of human existence as the questions of sin or forgiveness, it has overrated itself; it becomes an idol, and it creates a strange, deformed creature out of man in the previously mentioned context. Namely, it separates man into a legal part, a moral part, an economic part, and a historical part. However, man is one single entity, and if I seriously want to study him, I must regard him in his entirety. In other words, law turns against itself and recreates what it can subsequently punish.

#### Other Heads Are Demanded

[Nej] Many people have said that only those can be pardoned who repent of their sins. [passage omitted]

#### Accounting of Horn's Communist Past Demanded

92CH0527B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 10 Apr 92 p 4

[Article including telephone interview with Terezia Csaszar Szilagyi, Christian Democratic People's Party vice chairwoman, by P.Sz. on 9 April: "Vice Chairwoman's Private View of Horn"]

[Text] A statement issued to the NYIREGYHAZA radio by KDNP [Christian Democratic People's Party] Vice Chairwoman Mrs. Szilagyi, Terezia Csaszar, has whipped up quite a storm. In an interview published in yesterday's issue of this newspaper, MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] Chairman Gyula Horn regarded the politician's statements concerning him as mudslinging, not worthy of response. We asked the KDNP vice chairwoman yesterday to explain what factual basis she had to regard Gyula Horn as guilty, as a person held in unjustifiably high regard by the Western world. Mrs.

Szilagyi avoided giving specific answers to specific questions and insisted that her prepared statement be published verbatim. Accordingly, in response to our inquiry, she read the following text verbatim about the "Horn case" over the telephone:

[Szilagyi] I do not believe that I am slinging mud when I voice the views of a justifiably restless public that thinks this way. During the past few decades a country has been destroyed morally from an economic and other standpoints: No one wants to, or dares to, take responsibility for this. Similarly, it is fair to expect those who agreed to play a role in the past to report on how they managed the power they held. It was in this sense that I dared mention Gyula Horn's name. He has not given satisfactory answers to several questions, such as his role in 1956, or as to who was responsible for transferring dollars to the Soviet Communist Party's solidarity fund during his tenure as foreign affairs secretary [of the MSZMP—Hungarian Socialist Workers Party]. I would add here that the local radio has broadcast only certain excerpts from the interview I granted NYIREGYHAZA on 4 April, but even these excerpts revealed that I said no more than what Hungarian society as a whole has been expecting: that the principle of justice under law prevail in clarifying the past. I would also like to stress the fact that as vice chairwoman I expressed my personal opinion; in other words, no attack is being planned by the KDNP. Statements of this nature are made only by persons who judge phenomena on the basis of how they themselves would act. I believe that I voiced the public's sense of justice when I expressed dissatisfaction over the fact that the Western public has exaggerated the role played by the former Hungarian foreign minister in a historical situation that has evolved, a situation that began with the people of Budapest opening their homes to escaping East Germans. The western border was opened and the Berlin wall faltered in response to the joint effects of several factors, from among which, consistent with facts, Western leaders value primarily the solidarity manifested by the Hungarian people, along with the role played by Gyula Horn.

[P.Sz.] Could you state some facts?

[Szilagyi] I repeat, this is all I can tell you at this time. This is my response to Gyula Horn's reactions, and this is how I explain my motives behind the statement I made to NYIREGYHAZA.

#### Ethnic Hungarian Organization's 'Closed' Meeting

92BA0863A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 27 Apr 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Janos Vekas, vice president of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Vojvodina, by Istvan Kovacs; place and date not given: "New Models for Autonomy"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Vojvodina [VMDK] held its annual meeting on Saturday at Kanizsa [?Kanizsamonostor, Banatski Monostor], in the North Bacska [Backa] region. Our reporter asked Vice President Janos Vekas to provide an assessment for MAGYAR HIRLAP of the workings of the conference that attracted great interest.

[Vekas] The general meeting was productive, in my view. Despite the intimidation, 73 percent of the delegates appeared, and we regard this as a good turnout. We established two tasks for ourselves. One was to replace the absent members of the leadership in light of the rather serious political tasks awaiting to be performed. While recognizing their merits, we replaced VMDK council members who live abroad with others who are here, and who know how to conduct political discourse while sharing the fate of Hungarians in Vojvodina. The other function was to debate the organizational setting for Hungarian autonomy.

[Kovacs] An awful lot of malicious rumors, mainly in the Serbian press supportive of the government, preceded the general meeting at Kanizsa: The VMDK wants to proclaim Hungarian autonomy just to detach Northern Bacska from Serbia thereafter, they claimed.

[Vekas] We cannot comprehend such concerns at all, because to us, at least, it is clear that proclaiming any kind of autonomy is meaningless unless there is real, physical force behind it. As we have seen, Serbians of Croatia and Bosnia have been supported by weapons, and yet, they have not gotten too far with various proclamations; to an even lesser extent could we perceive that such a unilateral gesture would mean anything to Hungarians in Vojvodina—people with no supporting army and with no weapons. Our primary task is to clearly define our goals, to draft a document as clearly as possible to support these goals, and to enforce these goals on two fronts, vis-a-vis the Serbian organs of power of course, but, at the same, to also try to do the same in regard to international factors.

[Kovacs] Why did you feel that it was appropriate to hold meetings behind closed doors?

[Vekas] We believe that only closed meetings permit us to pursue our work in a democratic fashion. The Union is surrounded by so much suspicion, so much malice that I assume the delegates themselves would not have agreed to debate openly every detail of the issues had they sensed that the inciting, unfriendly press could use every internal dispute to discredit our organization.

[Kovacs] Many people recommended that the general meeting be postponed due to the unprecedented anti-Hungarian campaign and the timing which coincided with the Easter holidays of the Eastern Church. The VMDK insisted on convening the general meeting, nevertheless. Did this haste have something to do with the proclamation of the Serbian-Montenegrin constitution that has also been brought under roof in haste and has been scheduled for today?

[Vekas] No, it did not. This coincidence has not even occurred to us, to be frank. We have postponed the date a few times to allow the expert committee to complete its work. The general meeting has basically nothing to do with proclaiming the constitution of the new Yugoslavia. We have stated our position a number of times: We are unable to find in this draft constitution certain provisions which, in our view, are capable of settling in a satisfactory manner the situation of various national communities in the new state. On the other hand, we also said that our concept does not affect the territorial integrity of the country in which we live, be that Yugoslavia, Serbia or an independent Vojvodina; we would continue to demand solutions that guarantee the political identity [szubjektum] and autonomy of the Hungarian group of people in any case.

[Kovacs] The VMDK has called attention to itself with [the idea of] autonomy based on the principle of the individual. And yet, some new models for autonomy have now emerged. What is the essence of these, and what prompts the Union to expand the choice of [approaches to] autonomy?

[Vekas] We continue to believe that autonomy based on the principle of the individual is of primary importance, and feel that this is the kind of institution that unites all Hungarians in the Vojvodina and enables Hungarians to express their political will. Autonomy based on the principle of the individual is not in conflict, and is not irreconcilable with other forms of autonomy, however. We believe that three types of autonomy could be established in the Vojvodina: One would be Hungarian territorial autonomy in places where Hungarians of Vojvodina live en bloc. Unfortunately, this bloc would include only 56 percent of the Hungarian people, while the situation of the remaining 44 percent would continue to be unsettled. But a Hungarian territorial autonomy like this could lend stability to the institutional system. Accordingly, the peak institutions of Hungarians in the Vojvodina would be located in that place, and these institutions could also serve the cause of those residing outside of this bloc. In addition, we find it necessary to provide for special local autonomy in settlements in which Hungarians are in the majority, and which are isolated from this bloc. For all these reasons we find it necessary to establish a Hungarian Minority Council, an organization that represents and expresses the interests of all Hungarians in the Vojvodina vis-a-vis Serbian organs of power and toward the international arena.

[Kovacs] These proposals probably have their sources in materials produced at the Yugoslavia conference at The Hague.

[Vekas] We have underscored several times that we do not recognize as appropriate a situation in which citizens of equal rank are placed into two categories, in other words, that citizens in the minority within the nation that created the state, so called, should be entitled to a different status than other citizens whose nation is outside of Yugoslavia. We believe that these people are



entitled to the same rights from the standpoint of equal citizenship. Although in the course of our discussion with President Milosevic, the president remarked that, as we know, Serbia did not sign the document from The Hague, we responded by saying that new European concepts designed to protect minorities fully observe the solutions described in the document from The Hague. In this sense then, if Serbia or Yugoslavia, or some future state in which Hungarians of the Vojvodina reside, intends to join Europe, these, and only these solutions must be adopted in order to open the gates to Europe.

[Kovacs] Considering the public mood in Serbia, the unprecedented Serbian national euphoria, how is the Organization of Hungarian Autonomy going to be received, in your view?

[Vekas] We are aware of the fact that by waging psychological warfare and by arousing nationalistic passions they are trying to shake the faith of Hungarians in Vojvodina, they are trying to remove Hungarians from the VMDK and to prevent Hungarians in the Vojvodina to represent the momentarily optimum solutions before international forums, now that the attention of the continent is focused on this region—an opportunity that occurs once in 70 or 100 years. The way I see it, this maneuvering has not produced results: Except for a few people, Hungarians of Vojvodina are not turning away from the VMDK and are not willing to surrender their real interests in response to this campaign.

[Kovacs] What is the next step, what are you going to do with this plan in the near future?

[Vekas] We will proceed on two levels. We have reached an agreement with President Milosevic to establish a working group composed of representatives of Serbian organs of power and of the VMDK. This group will begin working on the specifics of these proposals. On the other hand, we must also continue to be present in the international political arena with the same intensity we have manifested thus far, taking advantage of every opportunity, thus exercising pressure in support of solutions we believe to be appropriate.

[Kovacs] Are the issues of Hungarians in Vojvodina going to be on the agenda in the next phase of the Yugoslavia conference?

[Vekas] We have received information according to which the committee of the Yugoslavia conference dealing with minority issues would already welcome VMDK representatives to join its work in the near future.

[Kovacs] The fact that President Milosevic has received the VMDK delegation last week has come as a surprise. We know that thus far, the Serbian president has avoided negotiations with representatives of minorities. Does this mean that the minority policies of the Serbian leadership are changing?

[Vekas] I could assess this matter only after seeing how it worked out in practice. In the course of this discussion President Milosevic said that he was not guided by the heated political atmosphere in receiving our delegation, but by the letter written to him by Andras Agoston, this being the third such communication. I believe that the essence of the matter is that as a result of this gesture the president has started dialogue, he has recognized that the situation of Hungarians in the Vojvodina has not been resolved, and that therefore he finds it necessary to resolve these problems through the appropriate institutions. Accordingly, this was an expression of political will; results will be demonstrated in future practice.

#### **Agreement Reached Among SZDSZ Factions**

92CH0527C Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 15 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by P.Sz.: "Alliance of Free Democrats: 'The Winter of Bad Feelings Has Come to an End'; The Party Will Become a Real Alliance of Groups"]

[Text] The SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] has reached an important turning point, faction leader Marton Tardos declared at the party's press conference held in the parliament. Tardos reported that they managed to redraft the principles they have proclaimed during the 1990 elections; henceforth, the SZDSZ will operate as a true alliance of individual groups representing political platforms. Marton Tardos is convinced that as a result of the agreement reached by the Liberal Coalition and the SZDSZ managing body, the SZDSZ "will recapture its splendid role in the transformation." Party Chairman Peter Tolgyessy said that the agreement consists of two parts; in part it establishes the basic principles for which the SZDSZ has been formed, in part an organizational unit has been established (the managing body) where various intents within the party can be integrated. Tolgyessy declared that an institutional system to create uniform policies has been established within the party; for this reason, henceforth, the party must address the voters as a joint force. Liberal platform representative Ferenc Wekler said that the agreement demonstrates continued unity within the SZDSZ. Wekler believes that the various platforms did not come about as a result of splinter movements, and that the party's leadership and legitimacy has not been questioned. What we accomplished is not a compromise, but instead increased efficacy has been described in written form [as published]. Despite all kinds of rumors, facts prove that last month the party's parliamentary faction performed unprecedented productive work. Quiet work may be expected to be seen until the next general meeting, when a decision is to be made about the future chairman of the party. Gaspar Miklos Tamas, the leading personality of the conservative union, made it clear that, although recently there were doubts whether broad party democracy—openly discussing the internal problems—would be useful, openness had a positive effect, in his view. The SZDSZ is once again demonstrating to the electorate that a large opposition party



exists, one that is willing to protect the basic rights of citizens. Speaking of the party's future, Gaspar Miklos Tamas said that the "the winter of bad feelings has come to an end." Peter Tolgyessy pointed out that despite grave concerns voiced by free democrats, there is a need for some kind of dialogue with the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], but the SZDSZ does not envision a possibility for close partnership.

Marton Tardos pointed out that any political movement has its difficult moments, but despite such moments party members are willing and able to cooperate. Conflicts never amount to hostilities. "No guns are roaring within the SZDSZ," according to Gaspar Miklos Tamas.

### **Increased 'Centralization' of Police Charged**

92CH0507A Budapest BESZELO in Hungarian  
28 Mar 92 pp 5-6

[First part of a serialized article by Ferenc Koszeg: "Dr. Boross's Law"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

### **But Who Appoints the Appointer?**

The drafting of the new government's first police bill was completed by the end of [Interior] Minister Balazs Horvath's tenure. That bill would have restored to the interior minister the authority the collapsing party-state had revoked from him, namely authority to exercise command and control of the police directly, rather than just "through statutory regulations and other instruments of state administration." According to the November 1990 draft bill, however, parliament and the Republic's president would still have restrained this authority. The National Assembly, "directly and through its committees, exercises constitutional oversight of the police"; in other words, a parliamentary committee could have questioned the nominee for the post of national police commissioner, before his appointment. On the interior minister's recommendation, the prime minister would have submitted the nomination to the president, who would then have appointed the nominee to a five-year term.

Statutory regulation of appointing [the national police commissioner] was sorely needed, because the numerous amending laws and deregulation had left too many gaps in the 1974 Law Decree on the Police and in the derivative decree of the Council of Ministers. Their latest amended versions specify that the national police commissioner appoints the [county and metropolitan] police commissioners, and they in turn appoint the police chiefs, but nothing is said about who appoints the national police commissioner. Well, further investigation reveals where the answer to that question can be found: in the already-mentioned Deregulation Law (Law No. XXII of 1990). The only trouble is that, specifically in the case of the country's highest police official, the law prescribes neither inviting applications for the vacancy nor a hearing before a parliamentary committee.

The first draft bill completed in 1991 retained without change the wording of the November 1990 draft bill. However, the subsequent draft bill (the second one completed in 1991) left out completely the sections regulating the manner of appointing senior police officials. On the other hand, it regulated in detail the interior minister's authority over the police. According to that draft bill, the minister would have exercised the employer's rights in relation to the national police commissioner, and would have approved the rules of organization and procedure for the ORFK [National Police Headquarters]. In contrast to the previous draft bill that had definitely banned the minister's interference in individual cases, this one would even have allowed him to issue instructions in them, "except instructions regarding decisions on their merits."

The latest draft bill reinforces all these rights and stops beating about the bush: On the interior minister's recommendation, the prime minister appoints the national police commissioner. Parliament and the Republic's president have no prerogatives whatsoever regarding the police.

### **From Local Police to Public Order Committee**

In the course of his already-mentioned hearing before the parliamentary committee, Balazs Horvath revealed that the prime minister was opposed to independent local police forces. That could lead to the emergence of local mafias, he [Horvath] worried. State Secretary Verébelyi consoled those who appealed to him, telling them the situation was not yet ripe. Today most senior police officers are echoing this consolation: It would still be too early to create independent local police forces.

The Law on Local Government, enacted by a two-thirds vote, lists the local maintenance of public order among the functions of local governments.

How can a local government be expected to carry out some function for which it has not been granted any authority?

The evolved system of local government makes the creation of independent local police forces truly impossible. The law has abolished the county's function to maintain public order but has not introduced a system of greater municipal regions, the idea of which had first been proposed by Ferenc Erdei and then worked out in careful detail by Istvan Bibó, still back in the 1970's. Instead of adopting "cities and their environs" as closely integrated regions, the law has made all units of local government equal: the city and a small settlement adhering to it, the county seat and a small village, and finally Budapest and one of its districts. At the same time, the law has left intact the system of county institutions and agencies. It would be impossible indeed to have 3,000 independent local police forces, all of them equal. That is why today not even the opposition is pressing for independent local police forces. Which does not mean that local governments should not have any influence at all over the police.

The bill drafted during Balazs Horvath's tenure would have given local governments four rights: the right to be consulted about plans for the establishment of a police authority; the right to participate in judging the applications to fill vacancies for senior police officials; the right to conclude a contract with a local police authority, for the performance of certain public-order functions; and the right to specify by ordinance the duties of the local police force. All this was regulated in detail in the first of the bills drafted in 1991.

Meanwhile, parliament achieved even more in the matter of appointing senior police officials. In November 1990, in conjunction with the enactment, by a two-thirds vote, of the Law Amending the Statutory Regulations Pertaining to Career Police Officers (Law No. LXXXII of 1990), the government and the opposition reached a compromise that seemed significant. With Balazs Horvath still the interior minister, the government agreed to appoint police chiefs with the local governments' advice and consent (in effect giving local governments a veto over the appointments). In exchange, the opposition was content with the [respective local governments'] right, not at all binding, to be consulted on the appointments of the Budapest metropolitan police commissioner and the county police commissioners.

In practice this victory did not amount to much. In making the appointments, the opinion of the committee judging the applications for the vacancy (the committee included a representative of the local government) was disregarded; in most cases the local governments were unable to exercise their veto because they were not familiar with the commissioners who were about to be appointed. In December 1990 Peter Boross, the newly appointed interior minister, declared that he disliked the system of inviting applications for vacancies.

In the spring of 1991, the Interior Ministry's leadership attempted to rid itself simultaneously of the system of inviting applications for vacancies, and of the local governments' veto as well. And it also attempted to restore by statutory regulation what it had already recovered through decrees (see box [omitted]), namely the minister's authority to command and control the police directly.

The opposition again offered a compromise. When warranted, the offer read, the government by its decree would be able to authorize the interior minister to take direct command and control of the police, for a specified period of time. That was exactly what Verebelyi had recommended in his 1989 essay. In exchange the opposition wanted to make the veto complete, by broadening it to include the appointment of police commissioners as well as the removal of senior police officials; furthermore, to make possible the forced resignation of senior police officers whenever a majority of the local governments on a senior police officer's territory rejected as unacceptable two of his annual reports in succession. A preemptory decision ended the talks that had been

promising to produce a compromise. No compromise, said the verdict. Neither the government's bill nor the opposition's amendments were able to muster the two-thirds vote necessary for passage. In the law regulating the local governments' scope of authority there is a huge gap where the chapter on the police should be. All that has been left of the provisions is that the senior police official must submit a written [annual] report to the local governments on his activity.

Last December all the opposition parties complained that the only right the draft bill's latest version gave local governments is that they could have a police station, if they paid for it and did not interfere in its operation.

The government responded to the opposition's objections by offering to resurrect one of the party-state's circumlocution offices, the Council on Crime Prevention. That institution, called "the committee on crime prevention and public security" in the draft bill's latest version, would adopt a standpoint on the state of public security in the settlement. The senior police official heading the next level would resolve possible differences of opinion between the committee and the police force. So much for local-government autonomy!

At the same time, local governments would lose even their right to be consulted on the appointment of police commissioners. The Budapest districts would be consulted on the appointments of their own police chiefs, but not on the metropolitan police commissioner's appointment. Instead of the counties, the Republic's prefects would be consulted. And who is their boss? You guessed right, dear reader. The very same Peter Boross.

Public security is a sensitive issue. As Budapest has already found, it is not difficult to create situations where the public, when satisfied, praises the police, but scolds the local government for the things with which it is dissatisfied. The public's reaction when the underpasses are cleared [of vagrants] is that the police, finally, are taking decisive action. When the illegally parked cars are towed away, curses are called down on [Metropolitan Mayor] Demszky's head. Yet in both cases the police are acting, or not acting, on their own initiative (or in response to a nod from Mr. Boross). And the capital has the right to put a good face to all this.

In itself the centralization of the police is power. Doubly so when it can also serve as a useful tool for discrediting local governments.

## EBRD Policies, Practices Discussed

### President Attali Interviewed

92CH0505A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG  
in Hungarian 4 Apr 92 pp 7-8, 10

[Interview with Jacques Attali, president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

EBRD, by Gyorgyi Kocsis in London; date not given: "Continental Shelf"—first paragraph is HETI VILAG-GAZDASAG introduction]

[Text] "When the idea of founding the bank first arose, the problems seemed far less serious than they do now," reads the introduction to the first annual report of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The new supranational institutions, proposed in 1989 to support politically and financially the change of political systems in East Europe and founded in the spring of 1991 by 40 member-states, with a capital stock of 10 billion ECU's, held its first annual meeting of shareholders in Budapest on 13 April, to report to its founding members and to the world on how successful it has been so far in satisfying the extraordinary expectations it itself had raised. At the bank's headquarters in London, we interviewed EBRD President Jacques Attali about some of the critical issues in conjunction with the bank's operations.

[Kocsis] Exactly a year ago you predicted that, in the next 10 years, the EBRD would mobilize the equivalent of 100 billion ECU's in additional resources for development in East Europe. But a few weeks ago you warned that 1992 could be the year of disillusionment. What has made you lose your optimism?

[Attali] My opinion has not changed. The danger of disillusionment threatens not the West, but the East Europeans themselves. For 1990 was the year of political euphoria, and last year was the year of economic euphoria fueled by faith in the free market economy. But confrontation with reality this year is causing the economic illusions to collapse and could lead to political disillusionment next year. That would be tragic. The world must accept three facts. East Europeans, that reforms require a very long time and enormous effort. Westerners, that they will have to provide more material assistance than what they have provided so far. And both Easterners and Westerners, that they must liberalize trade mutually, because development cannot be imagined without intensive economic relations. Even in the knowledge of these difficulties, I still maintain my forecast of last year, about those extra 100 billion ECU's reaching East Europe. After all, things are proceeding in the right direction.

[Kocsis] There are people who would question your contention, already because in its first year the EBRD has helped East Europe to 1.7 billion ECU's of additional capital, but merely less than half of that amount came directly from the EBRD. What is the cause of the delay?

[Attali] Anyone who belittles that amount must think the EBRD is distributing gifts. There is no question of our doing that. We are financing specific developmental ideas that will be to the bank's as well as to our respective partners' advantage. I myself consider the mentioned 1.7 billion ECU's an enormous sum, especially in comparison with the initial performances of other starting

financial world institutions. In the first year following its foundation, for instance, the World Bank did not disburse a single penny. Incidentally, it would please me if the proportion of direct loans provided by the EBRD were even smaller than at present; if every dollar from us would attract four or five additional dollars from other investors. But that would require, first of all, suitable legal institutions. But I wish to note that, among the countries of East Europe, the system of legal institutions is the most developed in Hungary.

[Kocsis] At the time when the bank was founded, you surprised the world with yet another of your statements. You said that the EBRD is a political institution whose mission is to define the criteria of democracy. How have you been able to cope with this task that has already foiled philosophers, political scientists, and even historians?

[Attali] We worked long indeed on this question, but in the end we have been able to compile a chart summarizing all the characteristics of democracy. At our April general meeting in Budapest we will make the document containing this chart public, together with our assessment of the individual East European countries' democratic development.

[Kocsis] Is it possible that Romania may emerge as the winner in that comparison? That is the conclusion one could draw from the fact that so far Romania has received the most money, 165 million ECU's, from the EBRD.

[Attali] That is because our bank is participating in a relatively small number of projects as yet, and therefore even a single loan may weigh in heavily. On the other hand, there is no question of our opening the money tap simply wider in the case of a country we regard as more democratic. And because we are bound to promote the development of democracy, we call a halt whenever we find that democracy's development has bogged down or has been turned around. That is what happened at the time of last year's coup in the Soviet Union, for instance. I ordered an immediate embargo on all of the bank's deals in the Soviet Union. That embargo, of course, lasted merely two days.

[Kocsis] It is common knowledge that the World Bank, which you yourself have mentioned, and its arm specializing in lending to the private sector, namely the International Finance Corporation (IFC), have been financing development for years in the former socialist countries. Was it necessary to create the EBRD because you were dissatisfied with the operations of these organizations?

[Attali] No. The World Bank was founded primarily to aid Third World countries. The EBRD, on the other hand, is a European institution, in which also countries outside Europe but sympathizing with it—namely, the United States, Japan, and Canada—are participating, for the purpose of unifying the two halves of our continent into a single economic and political region. We are



willing to cooperate with the World Bank, but our mission is different: to promote democracy, market economics, and European integration. For the countries of East Europe we are able to open doors to other European organizations as well. For example, we are able to include Russia in the European power grid or railroad network. The World Bank cannot do that. We can help the countries of East Europe meet the Common Market's quality specifications. That again is not a function of the World Bank. Another distinguishing feature is that the promotion of environmental protection is a preferential task of ours, not to mention our political mission. I would say that the EBRD is a third-generation international institution. The World Bank was the first generation; and the European Community, the second one.

[Kocsis] Referring specifically to the EBRD's political mission, you have pointed out on several occasions that you are not obliged to meet a narrowly defined criterion of profitability. Judging by the experience to date, however, the EBRD is indeed a very strict financial institution. In the final outcome, on the basis of what criteria do you choose your preferential objectives?

[Attali] The essential thing is that the ventures be reliable from the bank's point of view. The EBRD has gained the best possible credit rating in the international financial community, and therefore we cannot afford to enter into loss-making ventures, at least not in the first years. On the other hand, unlike ordinary commercial banks, we do not have to pay dividends to our owners, and therefore we can be involved in longer term ventures. On my part, I have never said that we would just pour money into East Europe, in the interest of democracy. But there is one area, namely the mass media, where a close link can be created between democracy and commercial lending. It has not come about as yet, but I would be very pleased if the EBRD could support financially the development of free, privately owned mass media—including the electronic media—in East Europe.

[Kocsis] Although the difficulties a new bank faces are recognized in general, many people nevertheless resent that the EBRD does not pass on to its customers the advantages it itself enjoys in the marketplace. In the three bond issues so far, the bank has floated very inexpensively bonds with a combined total face value of nearly 1.0 billion ECU's. Although in most cases the EBRD treats as a trade secret the conditions under which it provides loans, it is being rumored that your interest rates—because of the bank's excessively high operating costs, among other things—are higher than the IFC's for instance. For that reason General Motors Hungary, for example, has held out the prospect of not signing in the end its much heralded loan contract with the EBRD.

[Attali] All I can say is that if an entrepreneur is able to obtain a loan at lower interest rates elsewhere, let him do so. Then at least we can invest our money elsewhere. I wish to emphasize that I am speaking of the private sector. The conditions of our infrastructural loans to the state sector are undeniably more favorable. Regarding

operating costs, I merely wish to point out that they are at the lowest possible level, considering the conditions in London.

[Kocsis] Many experts feel that capital investment, rather than loans, is what there is not enough of in East Europe, in comparison with the demand. Within EBRD's activity to date, capital investment constitutes an insignificant part. Why?

[Attali] According to our charter, a third of the bank's 10-billion-ECU capital stock must be used for capital investment. Unfortunately, people often confuse capital investments with grants. We can only enter into very good ventures. After all, an essential element of a market economy is specifically that one does not throw money out the window. If we lose on business deals, our favorable credit rating will go down, and the interest rates [on our borrowing] will go up. Without stopping to think, we could spend the 10 billion ECU's within a year on ventures that flop, the bank could close its doors, and everyone would be worse off. We must not foster any illusions. We have to be able to say No.

[Kocsis] Might not this excessive caution lead to where the EBRD ends up using all its money to finance the state sector, because that involves less risk?

[Attali] Our charter also states that 60 percent of our sources of capital must be channeled into the private sector, or rather that the mentioned proportion must be attained by the end of the second year. But we cannot throw money away just to improve that indicator. I personally would like us to help local entrepreneurs, rather than foreign ones, in the individual East European countries.

[Kocsis] The EBRD's board of directors recently decided to admit 11 former Soviet republics into the organization. Aside from the fact that at present these countries are still coping with problems entirely different from the ones in, say, Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary, to what extent will the EBRD remain a European bank?

[Attali] First, as before, we will have to continue to channel 60 percent of our sources of capital into East Europe. Second, the Soviet Union has been a member of the bank from the very beginning; in practice, therefore, we have not admitted new members but have merely installed the disintegrated Soviet Union's successor states. Finally, it is definitely in Hungary's and the other East Central European countries' interest to be located in the heart of Europe rather than on its edge, and to have also to the east neighbors that are developing democratically.

#### Loans, Investments Listed

92CH0505B Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG  
in Hungarian 4 Apr 92 p 8

[Unattributed article: "The East European Select Team"]



[Text] The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] has approved to date the following loans and investments:

#### **Bulgaria**

A 40-million-ECU loan for the expansion of power-generating capacity and the construction of a liquefied-gas desulfurization plant that meets European environmental standards.

#### **Czechoslovakia**

An 8.17-million-ECU stake in the Czechoslovak Investment Company, the first Czechoslovak national fund with a capital stock of 117 million ECU's. The stakeholders are international institutional investors. Robert Fleming Holding Ltd., an investment consultancy, is acting as the company's adviser. The company's purpose is to invest in ventures of small and medium size.

A 24-million-ECU investment in the modernization of Cokoladovny, a confectionery-industry enterprise that has been transformed into a corporation. Its [other] shareholders are Nestle of Switzerland, the Czechoslovak State Property Agency, the National Compensation Fund, and a Czechoslovak bank.

A 23-million-ECU investment in CSA, the national airline that is being privatized. The EBRD and Air France will each have a 20-percent stake in the firm; the Czechoslovak Property Agency will have a 40-percent stake; and the remaining 20 percent will be held by other shareholders.

#### **Poland**

A 39-million-ECU loan to upgrade the district-heating enterprises of several Polish cities. Poznan Bank is participating in the loan. The purpose is to convert coal-fueled district heating to more environment-friendly gas fuel, and to prepare the enterprises for privatization. The World Bank is contributing 20 million dollars to the project.

A 5.25-million-ECU loan for the construction of three food-processing plants. The total investment will be 13.6 million ECU's and is being undertaken by a joint venture in which Industriebeteiligungs GmbH of Austria is participating.

A 47.1-million-ECU loan for the telephone network's modernization, to Polska Telefonia Komarkowa, a joint venture formed by Poland's state telephone company, and by French and American interests.

A 1.73-million-ECU loan for the construction of a refrigeration plant, to Lodom, a joint venture formed by a Polish state enterprise, a Polish-American joint venture, and the Polish-American Venture Capital Fund.

A 50.8-million-ECU syndicated loan for, and a 2.5-million-ECU investment in, the new office complex of

the Polish State Bank. A part of the 40-story, 75,000-square-meter building will be leased to business tenants. A Polish-American firm is managing the construction project.

#### **Hungary**

A 4.89-million-ECU loan for the expansion of Petofi Nyomda [Petofi Press]. The enterprise was transformed into a corporation in 1990 and then privatized. Its shareholders are Cofinec of France, the First Hungary Fund, the Hungarian Investment Company, the Hungarian-American Venture Capital Fund, Kereskedelmi Bank, and the firm's managers.

A 2.3-million-ECU investment in Microsystems Rt., making the EBRD the largest shareholders, after the corporation's five managers who hold a majority interest. According to a condition set by the bank, the managers may not dispose of their shares for five years.

A 90-million-ECU loan to the Hungarian Telecommunications Company, for the telephone system's expansion. The objective is to add 27,000 new subscriber lines in Budapest within three years, and 20,000 new subscriber lines in the provinces within five years, as well as to modernize the obsolete networks.

A 61.4-million-ECU development loan to General Motors Hungary. The Hungarian-American joint venture is planning to build 15,000 cars and 200,000 car engines a year.

#### **Russia**

A 5.1-million-ECU loan to Sovintel, a Russian-American joint venture, for the development of telecommunications. Sovintel will provide modern international telecommunications for Moscow hotels and office buildings.

A 9.8-million-ECU loan for the construction of three oil-drilling rigs in western Siberia, to the Russian subsidiary of America's Parker Drilling Company. The firm is expanding petroleum production in Siberia, on the basis of its contract with Belye Nochi [White Night], a Russian-American joint venture.

#### **Romania**

A 142-million-ECU loan to Rom Telecom, the state telecommunications enterprise, for the telephone network's development. The objective is to add 600,000 new subscriber lines and modernize 400,000 old lines; furthermore, to transform the enterprise into a corporation, to streamline its management, and to prepare for privatization.

A 23-million-ECU loan to a joint venture for the production of power-plant equipment, formed by Britain's GEC Alsthom, France's Alcatel Alsthom, and Romania's state-owned IMGB [Bucharest Heavy Machinery Enterprise].

### Lending Practices Described

92CH0505C Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG  
in Hungarian 4 Apr 92 p 9

[Unattributed article: "Progress With Deliberation"]

[Text] When Peter Vadasz, the president of Microsystem Rt., read the feasibility study—it is at least 4 centimeters thick—that the EBRD [European Bank for Reconstruction and Development] had prepared of his business, he probably found out things about his firm that earlier he had not even suspected. The feasibility study illuminated every nook and corner of the company and took months to prepare at Microsystem's expense, which amounted to more than 6.0 million forints. The feasibility study was a prerequisite for enabling the EBRD's board of directors to decide whether the bank should invest in the company.

Anyone who is unwilling to endure this torment, or whom the final weighing finds to be wanting, cannot count on the EBRD's flattering attention. "We are not a charitable institution," the bank's officials deem it necessary to emphasize repeatedly. The "winnowing index" shows how true this statement is. Of the more than 1,200 proposals the EBRD received last year, about 1,000 were rejected out of hand, and from among the rest the bank selected just 17 proposals that in the end were accepted.

In the bank's "Hungarian section," the experts who prepare the decisions "translate" this philosophy into Hungarian. Managers Peter Reiniger and Gyorgy Karady are in complete agreement when formulating the fundamental principles of investing by the bank as follows: "The EBRD will invest in a Hungarian enterprise if the investment simultaneously meets two conditions: if it makes the firm competitive in the world market, and if it can reasonably be expected to show a profit." The other two permanent members of the "Hungarian team" are investment-banking experts Nicola Bamford and Bill Watson. In addition to them, the team always includes an environmental expert for each Hungarian project it examines, and usually also a member of the bank's staff who has a good knowledge of the industry in question.

This mechanism applies primarily to private-sector financing, the EBRD's so-called merchant banking division that accounts for a lion's share of the bank's operations. Distinctly separate from this division, organizationally as well as in terms of work methods, is the bank's so-called development division specializing in infrastructure projects and providing loans that are guaranteed by the recipient country's government. (The two divisions are somewhat similar to the symbiosis of the World Bank, which supports large-scale public-sector investments, and of its arm, the International Finance Corporation, that specializes in helping the private sector.) It is obviously no accident that, in every East European country so far, the public sector has managed to obtain more of the EBRD's funds, in spite of the

bank's avowed preference for the private sector. A possible explanation of this phenomenon is that there is a truly urgent need for infrastructure investments (telephones, highways, power grid) in the region; but perhaps also the fact that the risk of the loans channeled to these industries is slight, because everywhere they will remain mostly state-owned also in the long term. On the other hand, the EBRD's merchant banking division must also cope with the problem of deciding which enterprises in the former socialist countries may be regarded as private firms. In the end, pragmatic considerations have swept aside the mentioned disputes. They say at the EBRD that a private firm, and hence eligible in principle for financing, is one that functions in the form of a business association, regardless of how large a stake the state momentarily holds in it.

This logic could provide access to additional capital also for the Hungarian enterprises that are to be privatized, but no such precedent has been set as yet. Peter Reiniger sums up the explanation for this as follows: The EBRD itself does not wish to participate in privatization in Hungary simply by buying blocks of shares in state enterprises. But it will gladly participate as a "third party" in so-called privatization by increasing the capital stock, under which foreign investors provide additional capital for the firms that are strapped for capital. However, the pool of such firms is limited. Westerners would consider Hungarian enterprises for their markets, rather than for their production installations. But those markets were mostly in the East and have since collapsed. Moreover, if a Western investor is "seduced" after all, he wants to risk as little as possible (sometimes even less than the real value), whereas the State Property Agency would like to get rid of the enterprise with as much debt as possible, at a price that exceeds the enterprise's real value. The gap between the seller's and the buyer's intentions is too wide, and the prospects of narrowing it are not improved when the State Property Agency suddenly replaces the general manager of the enterprise to be sold, as it is doing with increasing frequency, even though the privatization negotiations are more or less well advanced.

Because this pool of enterprises is limited, it is understandable that in Hungary up to now, aside from the Matav [Hungarian Telecommunications Company] loan that the state has guaranteed, the EBRD has "as a matter of course" been financing only private firms or joint ventures, including also the General Motors Hungary loan that is not yet final. But also in this direction the bank is encountering obstacles. One obstacle, raised by the bank itself (although, admittedly, the bank sometimes interprets this obstacle flexibly) is that no loan may be less than 5.0 million ECU's. The other obstacle is that the bank sets strict conditions for repayment, which the starting Hungarian private firms are rarely able to meet. But these difficulties can be bridged with the help of suitable instruments, bank officials claim. Such instruments include the two special lines of credit established recently; two Western commercial banks, Holland's

NMB [Netherlands Small Business Bank], and France's Societe Generale will break the lines of credit down into loan packages as small as \$100,000 if necessary, which will make them available even to small businesses. Perhaps an even more "fermenting" role will be played eventually by a venture capital company to be set up with the participation of several Hungarian and foreign banks, but this idea is only now being fleshed out in the workshops of the EBRD.

### **Environment Minister Keresztes on Dam Controversy**

92CH0527A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 11 Apr 92 p 5

[Interview with Sandor K. Keresztes, minister of environmental protection, by Z.O.; place and date not given: "Sandor K. Keresztes on the Trap Presented by the Court at The Hague; The Monster May Stand if Legal Proceedings Become Protracted"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] Speaking of the Bos [Gabcikovo] Nagymaros dam, Minister of Environmental Protection Sandor K. Keresztes declared at a recent technical-engineering conference organized by the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] that the government did not want to build the power plant. His arguments with environmental organizations center around the future of certain structures: whether they should be demolished or left standing, and, in the latter case, the manner in which they should be utilized. In the minister's view certain structures that were built as part of the investment will be needed to protect river branches, as well as to ensure navigability and to protect against floods.

[Keresztes] I, too, agree with the views of Janos Vargha, the head of the Danube Circle: The hydroelectric plant must not be constructed, and, mainly, it must not be placed into operation. We cannot accept either the idea of storage or the diversion of the Danube. But Janos Vargha would like to demolish everything and think about what to do with the Danube only thereafter; in contrast, my position is that we first examine how we could save the river and then demolish the structures that are not needed to save the Danube.

[Z.O.] What should be retained and what should be demolished, in your view?

[Keresztes] The problems of the Danube did not begin with the construction of the dam; for example, river branches have been devastated for many decades due to the reduced water level of the river. This cannot be remedied by demolishing the dam; that would only protect the potable water base. In order to save Szigetkoz we would have to somehow raise the water level of the Danube so that water also flows in the river branches. One solution could be the opening of the upper, closed end of river branches; this, however, would result in a

further reduction of the already low water level. Accordingly, some kind of damming is necessary, but I emphasize: There is no need for storage! In my view, one should consider whether certain structures related to the hydroelectric power plant could be utilized in the event that we opted for damming. These problems must be thought through thoroughly, but unless that is done, it would be imprudent to demolish everything just to reconstruct certain elements later.

[Z.O.] Couldn't the position you are taking, the idea of "considering things," raise illusions on the Slovak side to the effect that the Hungarian government does not wholeheartedly want to demolish everything?

[Keresztes] According to my proposed solution—and in this regard I agree with Janos Vargha—in theory it would be easier to reconstruct a dam, because certain elements would continue to stand, which would not be the case if we demolished everything. We must accept this risk, however, hoping that neither the present nor a future government would be sufficiently insane to place into operation the Bos hydroelectric plant, something they could not do on their own anyway. Unless the C variant is chosen, the channel can only be used with the cooperation of the Hungarian side. And Slovak government endeavors to rotate the turbines at Bos would be in vain as long as the Hungarian Government did not want that to happen. The turbines would have no water, because the faucet is at Dunakiliti, on the Hungarian side. The concern of the environmentalists is understandable if they do not trust the government; the possibility of an easy completion exists. But this risk is still smaller than demolishing everything without considering these things first, and to thus destroy the river.

[Z.O.] We pay less attention to Nagymaros when we concentrate on Bos. In this context one hears the following counterargument a countless number of times: Why should those who constructed the dam demolish it?

[Keresztes] This kind of sensitive task cannot be entrusted to anyone except hydraulic engineers. It is obvious that they are most competent in this regard; biologists and dentists are unfit to perform an engineering task of this magnitude. The restorations are estimated to cost 3 billion forints. This magnitude of this amount appropriately reflects the complexity of the task. The other side of this issue is that based on the interstate agreement, the dam system is the joint property of the two countries. This is why the Hungarian Government wanted to settle this issue within the framework of the 1977 interstate agreement, rather than referring the dispute related to Nagymaros to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. We already regarded the future of the Nagymaros investment as a closed case.

[Z.O.] Do you agree with the decision according to which we would seek adjudication at the International Court of Justice at The Hague?

[Keresztes] If the Slovak side responds in the negative, i.e., if they do not halt construction pursuant to the C

variant, the Hungarian party will have no alternative but to cancel the agreement. The direct consequence of this would be the filing of a lawsuit at the International Court of Justice, and I would prefer to avoid such a step because supposedly one cannot touch the object during litigation; the subject of the suit cannot be liquidated. Legal proceedings and the decision could be prolonged for years, and everything would remain in the present, unacceptable condition until a decision was made.

[Z.O.] Mr. Julius Binder, the president of the firm hired to construct the Bos dam, announced in a statement to

this newspaper that Hungarian enterprises would also help in constructing the C variant. Could the Hungarian Government prevent this from happening?

[Keresztes] Do not expect me to respond like a lawyer. At a time like this, when the construction industry experiences recession, it is conceivable that some people are willing to do so, but I would regard this as immoral and unpatriotic. I doubt, however, that the government could prevent this from happening. In a market economy everyone enterprises wherever he can.



**Walesa's 15-Month Presidency Under Scrutiny**  
92EP0371A Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC  
in Polish No 16, 17 Apr 92 pp 4-5

[Article by Tomasz Sypniewski: "The Topic Is the President"]

[Text] President Lech Walesa at a PAP [Polish Press Agency] press conference said, referring to the dispute between the "people from MON [Ministry of National Defense]" and the "people from the Belveder [Polish White House]": "What is needed is a willingness to come to an understanding, to yield at times, so as not to quarrel but to settle matters."

Those who know the president know that he does not hold the world record for yielding.

Fifteen months of Lech Walesa's presidency can be summed up statically: number of public appearances, economic and political initiatives, foreign and domestic trips.... Anyone interested in such a statistical game should consult the statistics yearbook, or the RZECZ-POSPOLITA annals, for example.

For me, this period is a series of tragedies, controversies and decisions which cannot be recorded so simply.

The personage of the president, his actions during that period, arouse enormous emotions and disputes among his fervent advocates and rabid opponents. When there is a dispute, the peacemakers tend to suggest that the truth lies somewhere in the middle, that opinions should be weighed, etc. But "weighing" is deadly dull. The extreme opinions are much more interesting (which does not mean that they are correct). Those that are decidedly "for," or decidedly "against."

I will try first to be FOR, and then AGAINST. Decidedly.

**The President's Preelection Rhetoric**

**FOR**

Lech Walesa's "reconciliation" with the United Peasant Party [ZSL] and the Democratic Party [SD] changed the arrangement of forces in parliament and made it possible to form "the first Solidarity government." But Prime Minister Mazowiecki's government was "Walesa's baby" only in part.

Walesa recommended Tadeusz Mazowiecki for prime minister. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, more than the prime ministers that followed, was able to create "an originator's government."

The first Solidarity prime minister, promoted overnight from the editorship of TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC, became the hope of all Poles; he owed this promotion to Lech Walesa.

And after only a few weeks of rule by the new elite, it became clear to Walesa that it does not intend to treat

the chairman of Solidarity as the most important ally of the government. He was assigned the role of "controller of workers' unrest"—a role just as difficult as it is ungratifying. Walesa realized that the growing social dissatisfaction might bring about a situation in which he, as one who unhesitatingly supported the government "under Balcerowicz," could quickly become the leader of an association which has no members. In addition, Walesa was surrounded by people who believed that it was essential that the base which supports reform be expanded as quickly as possible. They believed that the hermetic doctrinal position of the ruling elite may bring about a breakdown of reform.

Walesa had a choice—"obey" Warsaw and lose everything (society's friendship and his political base) or exert pressure on an elite which was very sure of itself. He chose the latter.

When the elections game for the presidency began, someone completely unknown thus far entered the picture—Stanislaw Tyminski, with his populist rhetoric. The lightning speed growth of support for this "man out of nowhere" surprised the erstwhile elite, who found no effective way of fighting it. Walesa found a way. He increased the number of his meetings in the outlying areas and, in his speeches, increased the dose of what the people wanted to hear.

Walesa learns quickly and he "senses" what people feel. Anyone who has not seen Walesa talking to a crowd knows nothing about him. His speeches were sharp and incisive and—well, let us accept it—populistic. But they grabbed the people and already in the first round Walesa licked the extremely populist demagogue Tyminski.

The "subtle" (without exaggeration, Walesa had to take quite a bit from Mazowiecki in this campaign) European was outdistanced by the Peruvian Canadian—election strategy and rhetoric does not have to be "nice"; it has to be effective. It would be well to consider what would have happened if Walesa, too, had "put on white gloves" and lost the battle with Tyminski.

**AGAINST**

Even if we believe that a typical rally type rhetoric and strategy, emotional and populist, really saved us from "something worse," did this perhaps not do us more damage than good?

But wait.

In Poland in 1989, an irreversible, let us hope, process of democratic transformations began. Irreversible even if, after a period of euphoria, some setbacks would occur. The elites, and Walesa too, behaved as if they were not aware of this.

The undeniable contribution of S is and will remain the beginning of the Big Change. Walesa's undeniable contribution is and will remain the charismatic leadership of "S" during the period of transition to a 35 percent democracy. But the decision to embrace Jozwiak and

Malinowski (the then leaders of SD and ZSL) from today's point of view was a great political mistake. If Walesa had not taken this step and remained the leader of the STRONGEST TRADE UNION, supporting its colleagues in parliament through its work in the factories and its threats to strike, it would certainly have been better. After four years of "preparatory" action, all the time watching those under contract, the situation of Solidarity and its leaders would have been totally different. A completely competent assumption of authority would have taken place. Solidarity's strength would have grown and the charisma of its leader would also have grown. Walesa did not sense this, despite his great intuition. And it began—the "war on the top," full of accusations and slander, the "victorious," for Lech Walesa, presidential campaign that revealed to the people how badly divided Solidarity is and how "not nicely" it is able to fight with itself. Was it worth it?

Probably not. In the political game of cards, the reform camp and Solidarity lost.

The last reserve, a man who without fear could have waited a year or two or five for his chance, lost a great deal to gain so little.

The political support on which he counted in the fight for authority, quickly turned out to be quite independent and realized its own plans and aspirations. A large part of the social dissatisfaction fell on Walesa himself and it will be difficult to determine how much of this was really his fault. What happened was very bad, as we will see in a couple of years.

### The President of All the Poles

#### FOR

The President, who was supported in the final round for the presidency by his recent rival from the Solidarity core, could expect that after the "Tyminski lesson" there would be a sobering up. That the post Solidarity forces would willingly agree to something that even a few months ago they were against—that Walesa become something on the order of a superarbiter. In the end, he left a man from the previous team in a sensitive position in the new government.

The first reactions to the replacement and later the expansion of personnel in the Belveder, immediately showed that Walesa was regarded with suspicion by his old friends. And so, willingly or not, he had to fight force with force. But in order not to be accused of attempting to take over the government, he did not begin to build a "presidential party," but gave strong support to Center Accord [PC]. In implementing a plan to be "the president of all Poles," he set, against a strong political grouping, the Union, another force, the PC. But contrary to the accusations of the Union, he did not weaken it, and he did not try to remove its people from the central and local governments. He aimed for balance. This was

meant to create a situation favorable to society, in which strong groupings would compete with each other for popularity.

To ensure that those Poles would be represented in the government who were afraid that the role of the church in the state would be diminished, he heeded the position of the Christian National Union [ZChN].

Because none of these groupings had a strong peasant fraction, he made advances to Rural Solidarity.

In this way he strived to create a balanced, though multiparty, political system in the country.

He wanted to be the president of everyone, therefore he rarely interfered, perhaps only when he felt that he really must.

#### AGAINST

The president, in announcing that he will be everybody's president, did not foresee that the term "everybody's president" will be understood as the "president of no one." This misunderstanding (conscious or not) was the cause of drastic reactions from the individual parties to everything he did. PC believed that Walesa favored the Union, leaving Balcerowicz, a nonaffiliated "unionist," in the position of deputy prime minister. The Union loudly criticized the expansion of the president's office staff, which was controlled by the "PC people." The president, believing that a counterbalance to the Union must be created on the political scene, supported PC, and this was interpreted to mean that he made a choice. That is why complete confusion ensued plus a frontal attack from all post-Solidarity directions when SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic] deputies were received at the Belveder and it was stated that the state also needs a "left leg."

Assurance at a meeting with farmers that there is no strong Poland without a strong countryside evoked an avalanche of accusations that Walesa is subverting the bases of reform by envisaging all sectors to be equal.

When the leaders of all groupings finally realized that Walesa will not support anyone because he supports everyone, the battle of everyone with everyone else began. A president who does not want to support us is not very appealing to us—that was the motto of the leaders of all kinds of groupings. And the president, instead of strengthening his position as a supra party arbiter, achieved the opposite effect. His position became weaker.

As if this were not enough during this so-called interim, Walesa also received signals "from below"; rallies were held in front of the Belveder by various groups who were bitter about the inept policy of successive teams and had a grievance against "the one who animates state policy."

"Since Walesa is everybody's president, he is our president too," is how the resentment of those assembling in front of the Belveder could be read.

The beautiful and wise idea, which in a strong state (enjoying public support) could certainly have worked, in our situation turned out to be a dud.

The elites, feverishly reinforcing their positions after the "free elections," forgot that, after all, there is a society waiting for the elections promises to be fulfilled, and there is a state which must be ruled.

Walesa, exasperated with the development of events, made it understood several times that he is ready to stand at the head of something so abstract as society. To the little parties and cliques, this had the ring of a populist revolution and the loss of influence and privileges.... Whatever he may be, "president of all activists" Walesa is not.

#### The President—Voice of the People

##### FOR

Walesa knows that the activists of all parliamentary groupings would easily fit into the Tenth Anniversary Stadium. That is why he frequently says that he is a worker, an electrician. This is how he attempts to remind all of those who forgot, that August was a workers' achievement. Not rightwing, not procapitalist, not pro-European, but workers. That the 10-million-member union, which he headed, demanded fair working conditions for fair wages, accountability of the VIP's, greater social protection, freedom of speech and conscience. (In those days there were no protests against unemployment because there was none.)

"I am a worker, like you," Walesa says to the employees of ELITRA, for example, and this is pure populism, because he no longer is, but...

The elites, if they have not gone mad from self-admiration, know that they cannot appeal to society, that they are outsiders, locked into their own circle (where, by the way, they are having a good time). The presence of a person who can say to the people "I was taken in. I am sorry, I now know that one cannot stray from one's roots" has great political significance.

##### AGAINST

Walesa does not realize that talking to people, organizing direct contact with him, takes a great deal of organizational and logistical effort. A program must be prepared, meetings must be arranged, and it must be clearly understood that no one knows what will happen, because a crowd is unpredictable.

The President-electrician should also remember that in his office there remains only one "simple" man—Wachowski—but there is no certainty that he would want to help the president in this risky game. In this case his interest is the same as that of the rest of the Belvedere's intellectual staff. All of them, by Walesa's "investiture," advanced several levels. It is very unlikely that they would want to return to the point at which they started.

Naturally, Walesa could announce who is a bad intellectual and who is a good one. But he already did this once. If only during the "war on the top," and he had to retreat.

Walesa, the president, is the creation of many actions, many people (and circles), who needed someone like him. And now, how can it be? After the "workers' August," not even half a worker in the ruling elite?

Prestigious awards from organizations throughout the world, doctoral degrees, finally a Nobel prize—those were the result of the political efforts of very concrete groups of interests. And he knows this. Therefore, he must realize what powerful forces he would have to deal with, in Poland and abroad, if he were to suddenly reveal himself to be an enemy of the establishment. And again, how much he would lose in order to gain nothing, because a revolution eats its own children (Anna Walentynowicz and Andrzej Gwiazda could say something on this subject). And the riots which this wave of populism would cause would not change much in Poland anyway.

It may be assumed that Walesa will do this in order to "scare" the elite, with whom he is losing respect and support, but can he, with the social moods of today, take such a risk?

Walesa was the voice of the people at the gates of the shipyards in 1980. He signed the 21 demands, most of which he "ratified" at the "roundtable."

But, forgive me, which of them, even in part (I speak of the demands pertaining to the people's working conditions and standard of living) has been fulfilled? Today, after 15 months of exercising authority, his appeal to the people would be a risk...but for him. The Solidarity people look upon him as "formerly our man," who when he found himself in authority, let them down. The place at the Gdansk Shipyards gate is vacant.

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The attempt to describe how one person can be evaluated from two different extreme positions, would have been easier if the person had not been Lech Walesa, president. Maybe it is easy for the supporters or opponents whose careers are linked to his position.

But an attempt at an objective glance must end with the thought that Walesa, like all of us, is still looking for a place for himself.

When he goes to a factory and hears what pains people, he says: "This has to be taken care of...."

When he telephones to another factory and hears that they cannot cope, he says: "Insofar as I can, I will help, I will bring pressure to bear...."

And, after all, in such cases he is taking on a role which is not his; he cannot work in place of the government, he does not make laws, and he is not a policeman; he cannot check on what some smuggler is taking out of the country



in his socks. At these moments he is again one of us, Solidarity people, who look at what is happening, or rather at the fact that not much is happening, and who react instinctively as in the past: THIS HAS TO BE TAKEN CARE OF....

When Walesa returns from a trip with a packet of matters that "must be taken care of" and the personal tragedies of people "who must be helped," he quickly learns that there is the "budget," that there are "current regulations," that "we must wait with this...." But some time later, he again goes somewhere, and again makes promises.

It may be that if the powers of the president were clearly defined, Lech Walesa would have an easier life.

### Role of Christian-Democratic Party Outlined

92EP0313A Warsaw KONFRONTACJE in Polish No 3, Mar 92 pp 8-11

[Interview with Krzysztof Pawlowski, senator and leader of the Christian-Democratic Party, PChD, by Jerzy Papuga and Andrzej Halicki; place and date not given: "More Work"]

[Text] [KONFRONTACJE] The immediate question is: Where are the Polish Christian Democrats?

[Pawlowski] The answer should be very concise, "In the forest," but it really is not so certain. The Polish political scene is becoming organized. You need time for that. Every leader among the Polish Christian Democrats is responsible for that, but if we look at it calmly, it turns out that the process of unifying the Christian Democratic parties in Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden was rather slow. We are accused of having lost the elections. But is this really a defeat? The party of the Christian Democrats only recently came into being, it has seven seats in parliament, and it will have more, because various people are joining it. After all, nearly all the political groups in the present parliament has Christian Democrats in its ranks. I always say that either we are going to create Polish democracy by force "from the top down," except that it will collapse at the first major approach, or we will build it up "from the bottom." Examples of building democracy from the top down are the Democratic Union and the Central Accord, which are now facing various sorts of internal struggles. I, on the other hand, am waging a policy of small steps, far reaching but well thought out actions. It seems to me that this is the only way we can build a stable society and political system. People first of all get together in friendly gatherings, interest groups. Then it very soon turns out that these groups are not very effective, that they need some other social bonds, unless the people get together for their own enjoyment. But in politics, you have to achieve success....

[KONFRONTACJE] That is a very interesting analysis, but it convinces us that the Christian Democrats meet mainly for their own enjoyment. Why don't you employ the term "Catholic policy"?

[Pawlowski] It is true that we are sometimes accused of not being very clear. At the elections, society came out in favor of certain symbols....

[KONFRONTACJE] Radical symbols!

[Pawlowski] That is probably too strong a word for it. Symbols intelligible to people who do not understand the mechanisms of politics. It was easier for them to accept the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland], which promised everyone everything, or the ZChN [Christian National Union], which only said that "we" are Catholics. It is clear that a concrete program found it more difficult to break through such a barrier, but I think that the process of integrating the Christian Democrats is progressing, although it could be done more quickly. But we needed to be more humble toward society and people's different attitudes. I think the time will come when people reject the symbols and the slogans and begin looking for those politicians and groups with concrete deeds behind them.

[KONFRONTACJE] Talking about the dispersion of the Polish Christian Democrats, we would like to point out the poor results of their actions with regard to the ranks of the faithful in Poland, which represent a potential social base. Do you blame society?

[Pawlowski] Heaven forbid! It bothers me when a politician says: "I am wise. They are stupid." After all, that's absurd. Democracy consists of the fact that we accept election results. The people are right to have voted the way they did. One cannot blame one's own weakness on society. At most, it is possible through further actions to try to correct one's mistakes and attempt to teach people something. That is the way it should be. Our group is implementing the principle of "the long march." In one of my responses to the press I stated that the Polish Christian Democrats would suddenly become a second political force in Poland. I was wrong, because I believed at the time that the integration process would go much more quickly. Today I believe that it will take eight years. That does not mean that the Christian Democrats will come to power, only that we will take responsibility for the country. That could have happened even now, but we did not accept the offers made to us. It is a very great burden to assume joint responsibility from the position of a weaker element. We decided to treat our participation in the elections in a manner that would preclude our being accused of manipulation. We did not accept any political compromises.

[KONFRONTACJE] In the present situation, compromise is the basis of effective politics.

[Pawlowski] I agree. There are a couple of organizations that are close to us. We are talking to one another all the time, but without any spectacular gestures like a couple



of smiling fellows on television shaking hands, because it could turn out that in a couple of weeks we will have nothing to say to one another. I cannot say where these talks will end, because I am not Mr. Moczulski, who knows everything, even what will happen the day after tomorrow.

[KONFRONTACJE] Do you make a distinction between the concept of "Christian Democrat" and that of "Catholic politician"?

[Pawlowski] Of course, because the two concepts are different. What differentiates them is the extent of usurpation. I am an ardent Catholic, but I do not mix religious affairs with politics. I even have a theoretical basis for dividing the sacred from the profane. I consider myself to be part of the church, and maybe this is all the more reason why I cannot agree to have its authority exploited for incidental political goals. It is not because I am ashamed. These are for me very subtle, subjective matters. Because of this, our group has rejected the principle of using the church's authority as a basis of our political activity. We use the term "Christian." This is why our approach to reality is traditional, even conservative. We are not anxious to accept something new in place of institutions and principles which have already been thought through long ago. We use the Christian system of supreme values as a basis, but we operate on our own. It is exploitation to burden the church with political affairs and the game of politics.

[KONFRONTACJE] One can make the accusation that for a politician who recognizes Christian values, you are "a docile lamb" in the realm of our parliament. Don't you like boxing at close quarters, infighting, like the leaders of the ZChN, for example?

[Pawlowski] I like close order battle, but I don't box. Why should I? I am still learning, but I would not become angry if someone considered me to be an amateur in politics, but I have accomplished something during the 10 years of my political activity. Success is important to me. I do not consider arguments or parliamentary conflicts to be cause for praise. Alongside these, you have to propose something concrete to society. A feature of good, sound policy is the ability to wait for your moment to come. You also have to know when that time is coming. I am interested in success, of course. I think that I have already made a career for myself. I have a good reputation in the West. Here, on the other hand, I am not interested in empty renown. Will I show myself to be trustworthy? I think that is an exaggeration, but I cannot stand pretentious nonsense. During the Senate's last term, I took the floor on a number of issues and won on all of them. That was always the point for me. I took the floor, when I had some matter to deal with. For me, success is to be the only person arguing in favor of a bill everybody opposes and proving that the Senate is wrong. I have built up a network of connections with Western politicians who often entrust to me issues of fundamental significance to Poland, those related to attracting foreign capital here.

[KONFRONTACJE] You are compared to Senator Celinski, although doubtless your political views keep you apart. Do you have any notion of "being a senator"?

[Pawlowski] Yes, I think that the Senate is particularly necessary during a transition from one system to another. While the Sejm works on over a dozen bills, the Senate is essential, but when the Sejm is working on over 100, we have the obligation to catch the mistakes and errors. Let me remind you that the Senate is elected and constructed independently. But this is only one aspect, which has nothing to do with the sense of fulfilling some sort of mission. Above all, I consider myself to be a provincial senator. The reason I don't want to be a deputy is that a deputy is more "political," being selected from a party list. Whether he or she wants to or not, although appealing to the interests of the voters, the deputy represents the party's interests. A senator, on the other hand, is elected by one concrete voivodship, that is, a certain part that is separated from the whole organism but at the same time is an economic and even a cultural whole. The voivodship government does not replace him, because the governor is inundated with daily matters that do not give him an opportunity for independent thought or action. My notion of a provincial senator assumes that I should be looking for the weakest points in my own area, the places where something has to be done as soon as possible. Later I look for solutions, sometimes not in the right places, because I am no genius, but it is easier for a senator to get a concrete idea through. Of course, such a person must have clean hands and merit respect. Later, you have to find people to offer this idea to. Some sort of organizational basis is formed. Finally, you have just to try for political support, but the group of people will take care of itself. I have managed several such things.

[KONFRONTACJE] You are considered to be the inspiration behind interesting economic solutions. Does this involve a political sense?

[Pawlowski] It involves more than mere idle talk. When we founded the Chamber of Commerce, we had to convince people about the need for economic self-government. The private entrepreneurs were afraid that would mean having government managers control them. We also had to organize the private sector first, and when this was accomplished, we created a classic chamber of commerce, with both government and private entrepreneurs. The same with the Business School, which has been operating in Nowy Sacz since last October, to serve that same group of people. I dreamed it up after becoming acquainted with a similar institution in Koblenz. The problems with professional managers in our country are far greater than there. The new cadres for the economy will not be provided by the academies of economics, which in the 21st Century will still be teaching along the lines of the economic policies of socialism. We must therefore create something new. That's the reason for the school.

[KONFRONTACJE] Do you make publicity for yourself?

[Pawlowski] Yes, because a politician should, but in the proper way. A politician should build up his or her position in the local society, in the political sphere and primarily in the economic sphere. You gentlemen may recall a certain senate discussion on protecting the unborn. At the time, I did not take the floor, but I voted according to my own conscience. I was not an advocate of sending women to jail for having an abortion. This was not just for humanitarian reasons. It was more for pragmatic ones. How many children would we have had to take care of whose mothers had been sent to jail? This is simply paranoia. It is not true that the church wanted to send women to jail. That is simply lying. Troubled by the problem of single mothers, after coming home, I asked my bishop to support the Gift of Life foundation. And today the first single mothers' home is already in operation. I repeat that one has to do more than just engage in empty talk. The "heart" of the Nowy Sacz voivodship lies on the other side of the Atlantic. One of my friends proposed opening a European Culture Center. She found a place and asked me for money. I told her to create an organization of Polish Americans, because many people who came from here return, and it could be that they would like to invest in this movement. Why am I talking about this? Well, the Christian Democrats are directed by guide posts designated by local communities. It is from that very place that we must begin to build Polish democracy. Not from the top. A building without foundation will shift and can tumble at any moment. This also applies to the economy. A boy out of high school recently came to me asking for help. After graduating he wanted to go to college. He was lame and, imagine, if you will, instead of thinking about his deformity, he went to York in England and passed the university entrance exams, but he did not have the money to pay the tuition. He came to me, and I made him an offer. I promised to find him a sponsor for his studies. And I found him one: 100 percent for the first year, 30 percent for the second, and 20 percent for the third. Why? Because this boy asked for help getting through the first year. "Later I'll manage somehow," he said. I believe that he'll come back. That is the Christian Democratic way of thinking.

[KONFRONTACJE] What is the Christian Democratic thinking and attitude towards the tremendous influx of egalitarian demagoguery and populism?

[Pawlowski] I do not feel good about them, because they are serious threats. There are attempts at all cost to thrust political content on the bitterness that exists objectively. There are certain things I don't like, but I have learned to be indifferent to them. I do my own thing. That is, I create a certain reality. I try to bolster the economic environment, but the business school did not add to the votes at all, because one has to pay to study there, so it is "for the rich," but I am on the lookout for a whole system of scholarships and foreign internships.

Motor Oil Company promised three three-month scholarships for our best graduates. This certainly is not giving into the egalitarian attitudes. What can be done to counteract this wave? First of all, assure political support to managers. Their community is fractured, terrified by social reality. For there to be political and economic stability in Poland, we need to bolster the employer "class." I try to support those who seem promising, so that they can go forward. The most important thing is the awareness that one is doing wise things, to become involved on the side of those who have a chance is to be involved on the side of the whole society. A person who achieves success in the economy will not begin eating two dinners and two suppers. Instead, the person is going to invest the money. This is my response to the growing populism and egalitarian demagoguery.

[KONFRONTACJE] The greatest threat for us is the possibility of drowning all that you have been talking about in a flood of half-parties that see immediate benefits from drenching the Polish scene. Unfortunately, such politics wins today.

[Pawlowski] Not to worry! On the one hand, we are aware of our own limitations. And now the question of compromise comes to us, and this after all is a matter of choice. If we clearly define our strategic goals, if we alter them to fit what separates us, we'll be successful. But can one be absolutely pure and noble? And still find room on the couch with those who admire us? I am not interested in this. I want to achieve success and rejoice in it a long time. Everything is created from the beginning.

[KONFRONTACJE] You are not taking up the basic issue: whether or not entering Jan Olszewski's government would be a good thing or a bad thing in terms of the good of your program and the attitude that the Christian Democrats inculcate.

[Pawlowski] No.

[KONFRONTACJE] That means that the PChD [Christian-Democratic Party] is in the opposition?

[Pawlowski] Are you being serious with me, when I said that my party is progovernment? Let's wait for the program. Then we will be able to discuss this. Andrzej Lipski received the nomination because he is a wise man and a good specialist. And we are certainly not going to force him to withdraw.

[KONFRONTACJE] The society has come out many times against the reform policy being conducted for the past few years. The politicians echo this mumbling "in favor" one time and "against" the next. It is probably a bad thing to be two-faced.

[Pawlowski] Yes, that's true. But we have nothing to discuss, because there is no economic program. I don't want to talk about whether or not I like the prime minister. What does that mean? I will ultimately work with people on the basis not of likes and dislikes but of

common interests. The PChD is not a command organization. Pawlowski cannot say "yes" or "no." My position need not be accepted. I don't want such responsibility, because it leads as a consequence to solitude. Our people work in the government, because they are specialists, without any sort of party instructions.

[KONFRONTACJE] But quarter and half parties are deciding for the country!

[Pawlowski] But I do not consider the present structure to be a lasting one. I think that in all political parties there must be a program break. And then various elements of the program begin to come together in a new way. We have to break down the social prejudices and personal biases.

[KONFRONTACJE] Without a vision of this breakup, one cannot operate sensibly on the political scene!

[Pawlowski] O, heavens, I have been trying to show you my way of thinking and a certain mentality. I am proud of being considered a "provincial senator." This is an element of that vision. I have my own personal ambitions, after all, but I don't know whether I will realize them. When does a person's greatest joy come? While one is eating ice cream, not afterwards. So too my vision is calm action, in the political system too. The disintegration cannot be speeded up, because it has to occur after the most important political interests have been clarified. I think that we are the first generation of politicians that are only creating the subsoil for the 16-to-18-year-olds. We are taking the worst things on our shoulders. We are making mistakes, but something may come of this. We are withdrawing to the sidelines, to make way for the new generation of politicians, and that's fine.

[KONFRONTACJE] Except that this stage must conclude with some sort of institutional solutions. As a man of action, how do you rate those who missed the opportunity?

[Pawlowski] That is their worry. Most of these people are honest in their own way. They want what is good. But we are all children of the old system. Where were we to find mature politicians after what the communists did to us? Some of us will learn quickly, because that is what the time demands.

[KONFRONTACJE] What sort of limitations are not taken into account at all in your political activity?

[Pawlowski] Stereotypes. All the complaints that foreigners are buying us out are more dangerous to me than the expansion of foreign capital. Gentlemen, don't link these matters to Catholicism. Catholicism has nothing to do with narrow thinking. Such fears can be found in any group.

[KONFRONTACJE] And there is no such thing as the Polish Catholic?

[Pawlowski] Please don't put that together.

[KONFRONTACJE] All right. But there are politicians who speak of themselves that way.

[Pawlowski] All right, but I make this request of you! After all, this is unfair. Each of us knows that people should not be asked this. Did I ask the managers studying recently in Pultusk whether they go to church? All that interests me is whether they think with good judgment. They impress me. Stereotypes are created somewhere in people, but not generally so. We must break them down by showing that everyone who invests money here is giving work to many others. Let's not exaggerate over the phobias either. They exist in every society. It seems to me that they will disappear in our country in time, but they will never be extinguished in some groups.

[KONFRONTACJE] A natural support for the Christian Democrats is the countryside, which is dominated by classist peasant groups. In the near future will it be possible to break down the "classist nature" of our parties?

[Pawlowski] Peasant politicians should continue to be an important support for an all national party. We cannot condemn them to a political ghetto, because it leads to well-known results: alarm, continual talk about the countryside's threat to civilization, radicalization of methods, and political struggle. Here I want to mention that I do not divide people into "peasants," "workers," or wise and stupid. Instead of playing on social attitudes of these people, I would do something to set in motion again the factory that has been idle a year. This is my credo. I am interested in the fate of these people. I would like them to find a job and improve their existence. In this sense, I understand their bitterness and dashed hopes. They did something, and in exchange they saw a worse future. They paid the greatest price for their effort. We have to restore the proportion, but time is needed to do this. And business.

[KONFRONTACJE] The concept of the all national party is a little disturbing, because it is reminiscent of the BBWR [Nonparty Block for Cooperation With the Government, 1928-35].

[Pawlowski] So, really, there is no political construction to use as a basis. Again, we can talk about something if a coalition or structure is proposed to us, one that does not break down our border posts, and if it serves the concrete purpose, that is, to build an economically strong Poland. Meanwhile, our general goal is neither democracy nor a market economy. That are after all tools, ways of resolving social problems. The goal is a self-propelling, creative society that maintains its own independence, its state. It is not the state that is to be the supreme value but the society and the people. The society should manage on its own and count on a strong state only when it needs to.

[KONFRONTACJE] Meanwhile, the society is giving ever more frequent signals that politics should die, because it is bad and dirty.



[Pawlowski] You can't create a society without politics and politicians. Ours, I want to have politicians with clean hands. Are such politicians in the minority today? I think that the time will come for politicians with a strong ethical backbone. It is not true, though, that all of them are "on the take," that all of them are depraved.

[KONFRONTACJE] There may be a social explosion, then what?

[Pawlowski] A politician should take that into the calculations too, but why such extremes right away? Politics and politicians exist to prevent an explosion. I see no signs that a social explosion is coming. Perhaps I live in a different world.

[KONFRONTACJE] So then what is President Walesa's game, if there is no threat?

[Pawlowski] I am not interested in that. I have no time to look at issues that exist actually in every situation. There are 24 hours in a day. I have to reject certain problems. After all, do I have to know everything and think everything through?

### Plans of Tejkowski's National Party Examined

92EP0339A Warsaw *TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC* in Polish No 14, 3 Apr 92 pp 13-14

[Article by Mikolaj Plonkowski: "Polish Strength"]

[Text] This Warsaw stone building on Hoza Street has a single gate. For a long time the residents have been wishing for a miracle, that they could have another gate, or at least an emergency exit. The ORMO [Volunteer Reserve of Citizens Militia (disbanded November 1989) had its headquarters here until 1989. Later the sign was changed to read: Boleslaw Tejkowski's Polish National Union [PWN]. It is therefore not known whether the ORMO has really left the site.

The people living on the upper floors have a problem reaching their apartments. It used to be that when they came into the building, people took them for collaborators of the ORMO "reserve," and the ORMO, on the other hand, suspected them all of being conspirators. The situation today is similar. Groups of skinheads fleeing from the police to find refuge under the wings of their chairman are suspicious that the residents might be policemen in civilian clothes, while the police, on the other hand, suspect them of sympathizing with the PWN.

### Activists

The words "Polish National Union" are written on the wall with a big red arrow pointing to the door. Once past the intercom, there is a view of the party headquarters. Packages of propaganda leaflets and books are stacked up against the wall. Through this mass of paper there is a path of sorts leading to the rooms. One of them has young people in it waiting for a meeting to begin. They are all skinheads, and they are all wearing green aviators'

jackets with the party insignia on their sleeves. They are dressed in jeans tight at the knee, hanging out over black Romanian army boots. On their fingers they wear silver signet rings. Two single men wearing black ties and matching black shirts are sitting near the window. The rest, without ties, sit in little groups discussing various drives. "And the guy with long hair comes out, and then what a circus! We put a lot of pressure on him. And this really avant-garde woman goes: 'Why aren't you hitting me?' Stupid Jew whore!"

"There I am going down the hall at school, and there's this fellow I hit with a baseball bat. Right away he took off."

"My old man came up to me one evening, saying: 'I saw you on television. You were there. And so what. A fool doesn't understand anything but how to grind.'" There was healthy laughter all around....

### Party Workers

A large man around 50 appears at the door. "Gentlemen, please come into the hall. The meeting's getting started." A compact group comes into the next room. The squawking sound from the house intercom is barely audible above the sound of heavy boots.

There are several rows of chairs. There is a green cloth over the table at the front. On the yellow wall is a hideous eagle, giving the impression that his crooked talons are holding the bald head of a fellow who has stood up to welcome the people coming in. He sits down, or maybe it is just that the eagle has relaxed its grip.

There are five chairs behind the table. The middle one is empty. Old men sit in four of them. Puffy faces, double chins, stomachs spilling out over old-fashioned suit jackets buttoned with one button. And those watchful, restless eyes proudly scrutinizing the skinheads dressed in the organization's uniforms.

### Raising the Flag

In the silence that fills the room one can hear timid whispers and the wheezing of members of the board. Everyone is waiting. This is it! No, only some more skinheads with their girls. The short girl has thick, brown hair, dark skin. She is wearing a sheer dress. Maybe now... Yes! Two well-built young men come in escorting a small slender man with light colored hair at the sides of his balding head. He stops at the empty chair behind the green table. It is Boleslaw Tejkowski. He puts his right hand out in front of him and shouts: "Poland for Poles!" Everyone gets up, extend their right hands and give a powerful shout that fills the room: "Poland for Poles!" They sit down. Now the late arrivals can come in, Bismarck and Cezary. Their friends greet them: "Hi, Bismarck Jew!" Chairman Tejkowski says calmly: "Gentlemen! No talking."

### The Speech

Deadly silence. After all, the people here came to find out something, understand something. The chairman gets up. Today he talks about a secret Defense Ministry report. He has read in the report that the Polish army will be reduced to 80,000 soldiers, and the American and German armies will take over at least five bases abandoned by the Soviet army: in Swinoujscie, Brzeg on the Oder, air fields near Cedynia and Kolobrzeg. "The Jew Walesa seems to have promised the West that he will put the Polish nation to sleep. This idiot fears for his skin," Tejkowski claims. "Previously, the Soviets guaranteed the governments for the communists. Now the Polish army is against the president and this whole Jewish flock that is selling out Poland. At the moment the revolts can count only on the Office of State Protection, some 2,000 agents of the Mossad. That is the reason for wanting to bring in foreign armies."

For Tejkowski, everyone is a Jew, including Pope John Paul II, whose mother is said to have funded a synagogue in Wadowice. The pope is acting on behalf of the Jews. He calls for turning the other cheek, which after all means that "in addition to a factory already sold off for nothing we have to give the Jews one more for free." The pope supports Walesa. Together they are casting their spell over the Polish nation. That is why operations like the one in Zgorzelec are necessary. It is the only way to wake up the Poles.

"Zgorzelec was a lovely success. The Jewish officials became frightened, when we shouted that we were going to shoot at the German armies," the chairman says. The word "Zgorzelec" stirs the people in the room. People begin to reminisce: Some 500 skinheads came from all over Poland. A whole repertoire of operations was used: fights with police units and occasional Germans, destruction of shops and the railway station, overturning cars. Eighteen detained persons were redeemed for 3 million zlotys [Z]. The police seized 20 banners. The whole affair cost the Union Z10 million. The chairman assures the people at the meeting that the nation will awaken. The first money is coming in already. "The next demonstrations will have to be better organized and on a much bigger scale." Tejkowski is called to the telephone. He goes out.

### Debate

After the chairman comes back, he takes up a theme. He gesticulates vigorously, and supporting himself with his two hands on the table, he declares that in mid-May and June the government will fall, because of peaceful PWN demonstrations. "Even today a march of 50,000 organized young people could take Warsaw. The army will join us and take care of all the Pole murdering Jews and Germans. The army is unhappy, especially the senior officers."

Not everyone is excited by the vision of taking Warsaw. Several fighters are in a heated discussion in the corner. Others, their heads buried in their hands, do not even let

on they are listening. But some, like Cezary (tie, fat cheeks, a perpetual stupid grin), ask: "A formal question: What about us? We have to organize better, because there were several instances where there was trouble." An old man wearing glasses seated next to the chairman puts two fingers up in the air: "Mr. Chairman, if I may?" The answer is mumbled in the national style, but one can guess that the BOM [Youth Combat Units] will be broken down into groups of 10, the leader of each to know and vouch for his own people. For the time being, the weapons to be used are at the people's discretion: baseball bats, brass knuckles, and knives. In the future, there will be identical uniforms to replace today's shaven heads and the PWN patch on the sleeve. In the next demonstrations in Poland they will go out in groups of no more than 20 people. Each unit will be piloted by an adult. The police seem to talk differently with older people. The unit will not come together until they reach the place of the demonstration. All this is to avoid having the police grab anyone at the stations.

How to choose the leaders? The people at the meeting direct their eyes to Cezary. He made flags and was hit several times with a night stick. That is why he has a tie. Who else? Cezary stands up and says: "It's hard to choose now. We stir things up. We get into a crowd. We do our thing. In the struggle we will see who is better." From the back rows somebody says: "On Thursday the anarchists will be a Zacheta. They want to legalize narcotics."

Cezary adds: "Grab the Jews!"

Tejkowski protests: "The leaders. And nobody has patches on his sleeve. Until you yourselves...."

The Zacheta operation is accepted.

### Joint Speech

At every meeting of this type, several people become bored and leave the hall during the meeting. Here too part of the discussion is carried out into the corridor. For the moment nothing is happening inside, and people are staring blankly at the ceiling, awaiting the next words from the chairman. Tejkowski sits down. He takes a sip of water for his throat: "You, the future politicians, must learn the methods of political warfare." Quiet comes over the room. Tejkowski recommends bluffing. As in Katowice, where the PWN announced an anti-German demonstration. Hundreds of policemen and reporters waited for nothing. Nobody showed up, but it showed how afraid the police was of fighting squads and rabble rousing. Now it is warning against the Jewish MOSSAD, which fakes the suicide of political activists. He notes in passing that this does not happen with the German-Jewish politicians from other national parties. "I don't like the fact that non-Poles are filling all the seats on their boards. Something has to be done about this." Members exchange understanding looks. "We older people, for our part, will print leaflets revealing the

Jewish backgrounds of the politicians. And not just those from our country or the Szczepiec party, but other parties too."

The clenched fist is the traditional instrument of battle. The chairman does not hide the fact that one must often resort to fists.

"Polish patriotic youth has the right to hit Polish Jews, Germans, and Jew guided policemen who attack." Somebody in the room asks how to recognize a Jew. According to Tejkowski, anyone who works for the benefit of other Jews and harms Poles is a Jew.

#### Resolutions

The BOM will hold demonstrations in front of the Israeli and German embassies. The slogans will be: "A strong Poland!" "Jews out!" and "Poland for Poles!"

They will also burn several flags.

During the Zacheta operation, BOM leaders will be designated.

It is recommended that people collect information on any foreign politicians visiting Poland, especially "gentlemen" from Israel and Germany. Appropriate welcomes will be arranged.

Additional flags and banners must be made. One of the important symbols will be a red background with a white circle in the middle of it with a crooked figure reminiscent of a swastika.

Next meeting in a week.

"Everyone stand!" Tejkowski commands. Simultaneous scraping of chairs. A forest of outstretched hands. "Polish strength, Polish strength!" The skinheads shout evenly and loudly, following their chairman.

[Box, p 13]

"We are announcing respect for all national groups, so we are a peace movement."

—Boleslaw Tejkowski

[Box, p 13]

Neofascism is a political movement and direction following World War II striving to reawaken fascism; also a movement striving in a given country to introduce total nationalist dictatorship based on fascist models or linked to fascist ideology.

[Box, p 13]

Nationalism (Latin "natio" = nation); a sociopolitical attitude and form of ideology subordinating the interests of other nations to the interests of one's own nation or race, expressed in national egotism, in magnifying the virtues and overlooking the weaknesses of one's own nation, in the effort to gain special privileges for it, in aversion, intolerance and enmity towards other nations.

[Box, p 13]

**Fascism:** A political movement and direction resulting from the general crisis of capitalism; their ideology consists of anticommunism and chauvinism, as well as racism. Fascism appeared after World War I in Italy. It appeared in its most degenerate form in Germany.

[Box, p 13]

#### Brown Before Our Eyes

It is irrelevant whether Mr. Tejkowski is normally abnormal or whether he is cleverly pretending to be psychotic but is well aware of what is happening. One way or the other, his actions have already ceased to be part of political folklore.

Not only in Poland but all over Europe, after all, Europeans are dumfounded and feel threatened as they discover that the "relics of fascism" are coming to life. As everyone knows, periods of political instability and great reforms in customs and moral values (just like our 20th Century has gone through many times) favor explosions by extremists going by various names, but in Poland the instability is especially clear. There is very great fear about the future. There is very deep disappointment about recent ideals. And this is all overlaid on a typically Polish psychological distortion, a megalomania type of "exceptionalness" combined with an inferiority complex, which all in all produces spontaneous xenophobia.

Poles do not have sympathy for anyone, not even the Hungarians. They have something against everyone. Therefore, Tejkowski's fighting squads, if they do not know it, sense that their racist excesses can count on having the majority overlook them and on receiving the approval of a sizeable proportion of Poles. Italian and German fascism grew out of a similar background of public attitudes, even under the leadership of what would seem to be equally grotesque leaders. This was true of Russian bolshevism, although it used a different phraseology.

So should the skinheads and neofascists be locked up? Heavens no! This would just give them their idols and victims for the cause! Should we tolerate them and close our eyes? Worse yet. Ignoring people makes them bold. Trust that some sort of pedagogic talk will reach these dazed people? Nonsense.

Unfortunately, every reaction to these fantasized fighting squads may make the disease worse. The only effective medicine is to restore a state of normalcy throughout the country in all its structures and in all the significant groups in society. And we have already been waiting for this a long time. W.G.



## 2 Officers Associated With Viritim Profiled

92EP0324B Warsaw GLOB 24 in Polish 25 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by (wkr): "Two Faces of the People From Viritim. A Moral Force"]

[Text] Lieutenant Colonels Ryszard Dorf and Franciszek Sznajder (both retired) are leaders of the military organization Viritim with which Deputy Minister of Defense Romuald Szeremietiew is associated. The objective of Viritim is to decommunize the Polish Armed Forces and to "return the army to the people"; as statements by the leaders of the organization suggest, its "accomplishments" to date include the departure of Jacek Merkel from the Belweder, and Bronislaw Komorowski and Janusz Onyszkiewicz from the Ministry of National Defense.

Ryszard Dorf condemns the "scoundrels of socialism" who "at one point" tore "medals and crosses off the chests of soldiers" and who now stand "in the first rank in Czestochowa." Dorf wants "the army to become a moral, political, and military force." Franciszek Sznajder introduces himself as a steadfast opponent of the former Minister Kolodziejczyk and former Deputy Minister Komorowski who, as he maintains, craftily removed him from the army, accusing him of burning records at the Training Center of the WSW [Internal Military Service] in Minsk Mazowiecki.

Dorf argues: "This was patently false. Sznajder was against burning the records and, having learned that it had come about the records being burned, reported this to Deputy Minister Komorowski. This is what he was booted out for."

Dorf himself began "to return the army to the people" as early as the 1970's. At that time, military justice organs documented seven cases in which he ill-treated soldiers on active duty. In addition to trivial orders to crawl for four hours or to jump "toad-style" for many hours, or to salute trees for a long while in cold weather, Dorf also assigned to his subordinates more refined tasks, such as carrying 25-kg concrete blocks, so-called *trylinki*, until exhausted, or carrying them on the body of the most obstreperous soldier, whom his colleagues held taut by his arms and legs like a piece of canvas.

Dorf tried to continue a career of this kind in the next decade, but in 1983 he was forced to leave the army. Lieutenant Colonel Adam Zajac, retired, who has known the current leader of Viritim for many years, told us: "Political motives were not behind this, as Dorf maintains, because his ideological stance was very highly valued in the People's Polish Armed Forces, but it was rather for a common crime." A sentence of the Court of the Warsaw Military District for the beating, while intoxicated, of a handicapped person who interceded on behalf of a woman whom Dorf, appearing in uniform, tried to drag into his official car in front of the House of the Polish Armed Forces in Warsaw, was the reason for the actual discharge from the armed forces.

Lieutenant Colonel Franciszek Sznajder, currently a consultant to the Central Planning Administration, has equally spectacular moral grounds for conducting decommunization in the army. Upon graduating in 1956, he started working at the Powiat Security Administration in Chelm as an operations ensign. After the Security Administration was disbanded he "was rushed to the press." After the Security Service was set up, Sznajder was taken in by the operations division of this service in Lublin.

In 1959, he was drafted into the army at his own request. In the army, he held various positions in the political element. He served in WSW units until this establishment was disbanded. He was decorated with the Cavalier Cross of the Order of the Rebirth of Poland and rewarded by an assignment to the Polish Military Mission in Berlin (1983-86).

As stressed in his service evaluation, Sznajder discharged his responsibilities "conscientiously, and his training and operational experience made it possible to actively use him for the destruction of the archival records of the WSW in February and March 1990," for which he was "honored with a cash award and a promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel."

Dorf and Sznajder believe that "army positions should be taken by people who in the past did not identify themselves with Communism."

At any rate, they are decommunizing the army due to the moral force imparted by their experience and views.

**Former Communist Leaders Eligible for Pardon**

AU0605145192 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian  
29 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Octavian Radulescu: "How and How Long Will the Members of the Political Executive Committee Sit in Prison?"]

[Excerpts] In DREPTATEA on 24 April 1992 we quoted Minister of Justice Mircea Ionescu-Quintus as saying that the members of the former Political Executive Committee [PEC] of the Romanian Communist Party [RCP] who are over 60 years of age may be conditionally freed from prison after serving one-third of their term.

We point out that this is mandatory only for sentences of more than 10 years; for sentences of less than 10 years, the prisoner need only serve a quarter of his term.

On the other hand, we emphasize that the aforementioned dispositions apply not only to men over 60 years, but also to women over 55 years of age.

When calculating the term effectively served, one also takes into consideration the days earned by the prisoner through work done in prison, thus further reducing the prisoner's actual term, if the prison authorities decide that "the comrade has earned a certain number of days through work."

One should also emphasize that Romania's president may grant individual pardons, while heart attacks or suicide attempts may also be invoked as reasons for individual or general pardons. [passage omitted]

The PEC members have either separate cells or are sitting two in a cell at the most; of course, each cell is heated and has a television set and refrigerator. The "prisoners" are more elegantly dressed than us outside, in impeccable suits, white shirts, and ties; let alone the imported food and medicines they receive, visits from family members, and interviews with the Romanian and foreign press and television stations. [passage omitted]

## **Macedonian, Greek Views on Macedonian Issue**

### **Macedonian View**

92BA0808A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT  
in Finnish 24 March 92 pp C 1

[Article by Mika Petterson: "Small and Impoverished Macedonia Tried in Vain To Join the Club"]

[Text] Professor Denko Malenki had a rough time of it in Helsinki on Monday. In hallway discussions and one-on-one conversations he tried to convince member nations of the CSCE that the southernmost republic of what used to be Yugoslavia, the tiny and impoverished Macedonia, qualifies for membership in the CSCE.

Maleski was unsuccessful. The bureaucrats left Macedonia and its plea out in the vestibule of the CSCE.

### **It Is Hardly Neighborliness**

Maleski is the first foreign minister of a Macedonia that has declared independence. On Monday he was explaining his country's desire to be independent to Minister of Foreign Affairs Paavo Vayrynen. "We were given a very good reception," Maleski said after the meeting.

Only Bulgaria, Turkey, Slovenia, and Croatia have recognized Macedonia's independence. Maleski had hoped that CSCE membership would bring international recognition with it.

Macedonia is having quite a squeeze placed on it in the Balkans. Neighboring Greece opposes its independence because of a dispute over the name. Albania is suspected of coveting parts of Macedonia for itself. Bulgaria has recognized its independence but does not consider the Macedonians to be a distinct nationality.

Macedonia, with a population of less than 2 million, found itself on a collision course with Greece immediately upon voting to declare independence.

Greece demanded that Macedonia change its name prior to becoming independent. Greece believes it historically owns the right to use the name Macedonia. It believes the fact that its northern neighbor wants to use the name Macedonia is an indication that it intends to expand southward.

"I can assure you that we have no territorial demands to place on Greece," says Maleski in a way that makes it sound like an oft-repeated phrase.

### **Nationalistic Elements**

Maleski considers it senseless that Greece attempts to use historical interpretations going back thousands of years to support its position in the name dispute. "The facts of the matter are that we inhabit and have inhabited Macedonian territory for hundreds of years. We have to look to the future, not the past," said Maleski.

"Besides that, many things are connected to the name. We have no other name in reserve."

Maleski did not dispute that there are ultranationalists among Macedonians also. They have outlined the borders of a greater Macedonia upon maps and have imprinted their proposals on a new currency note. The symbol on the note has been the Greek city of Thessalonika. "These are not recommendations of the government," points out Maleski.

As many as one-fourth of Macedonia's inhabitants are Albanians. These boycotted the independence referendum. Maleski called their reasons "misunderstandings" and said that all of the parliament members from the Albanian minority were in favor of the independence declaration.

### **Independence Without Arms**

Maleski says that Macedonia wants to prove that in the "New Europe" a nation can become independent without arms or violence.

"We did not participate in Yugoslavia's war but condemned it from the beginning. We did not send our youths into the war," said Maleski. Now Macedonia has withdrawn its representatives from various organs of the former Yugoslavia including from Yugoslav Embassies.

### **Army Withdrawing**

Macedonia has already begun patrolling its own borders. The withdrawal of Yugoslavia's Federal Army should be completed in the near future.

Maleski believes, unlike many outside observers, that Macedonia is economically capable of independence. The war impoverished Macedonia even more. Inflation has escaped all controls and estimates place unemployment at one-fourth. Maleski hopes that the economy will enter an upswing once cooperation with neighbors commences—in the spirit of the new Europe.

### **Greek View**

92BA0808B Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT  
in Finnish 2 April 92 p C 1

[Article by Mika Petterson: "Skopje Must Come to Its Senses"]

[Text] The state secretary of the Greek Foreign Ministry cannot accept the use of the name Macedonia by the southernmost republic of what used to be Yugoslavia if that republic is to be independent.

Greece accuses Macedonia of having expansionist aspirations and of terrorizing minorities within the republic. Macedonia's dominant political party, VMRO [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization], is made up of "chauvinistic and communistic extremist elements," burst out Virginia Tsouderou, state secretary of the Greek Foreign Ministry, in Helsinki last week.



Greece's choice of language is full of the passion and pathos that is peculiar to the Balkans. Greece is angry because its position in the dispute about the name of the former Yugoslav republic is not understood by others.

#### Minorities "Harassed" in Skopje

State Secretary Tsouderou tried to enlighten international opinions last week at the opening of the monitoring convention of the CSCE, to which she had come as a participant in place of Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonios Samaras.

Tsouderou discussed the Macedonian issue with Paavo Vayrynen among others. "One thing Finland and Greece have in common is a soft spot for those who are weak," said Tsouderou.

The HELSINGIN SANOMAT interview with Macedonian Foreign Minister Denko Maleski, which appeared on 24 March, had been translated for Tsouderou. Maleski defended the concept of independence for his republic in that interview.

"Not a single word about their minorities. For heaven's sake, why is no one speaking about them?" wondered Tsouderou.

Tsouderou quickly listed the "forgotten" minorities of Macedonia: the Albanians, Greeks, Serbians, Gypsies, and Bulgarians. According to Tsouderou minority groups are under surveillance and are harassed on the streets of Skopje. They do not even have the freedom of speech.

The inhabitants of Macedonia were asked to state what they wanted to claim as their nationality.

"If one said he was Greek, then, for example, his pension was immediately reduced," said Tsouderou.

Tsouderou's list of accusations continued: Macedonian schools teach that Thessalonika is the capital of the republic and that Alexander the Great was a Slav.

Greece cannot accept the use of the name Macedonia by the southernmost republic of what used to be Yugoslavia as that republic gains independence. It is expected that the EC will recognize Macedonian independence as early as next week.

According to Tsouderou history cannot be ignored. The name Macedonia is such an essential part of Greek history that Greece alone owns the right to use the name.

In her interview Tsouderou referred to the republic as Skopje, the capital of Macedonia. At a few instances she was forced to use the form "so-called Macedonia." The name Slavic Macedonia, which has been offered as a compromise solution, is not acceptable to Greece either, says Tsouderou, since not all inhabitants of Macedonia are Slavs, and Greece wishes to protect minorities.

According to Tsouderou only 30 percent of the historic Macedonia is now within modern-day Macedonia, while 55 percent of it is in Greek territory.

"Tito named the southern part of Yugoslavia Macedonia as a prelude to expansion southward," said Tsouderou.

#### Greece Hoping for Breakup of Dominant Party

In Tsouderou's opinion there are clear indications that the government of Macedonia intends to make the dream of the former Yugoslav strongman come true. "They want to unify Macedonia on their own terms."

According to Tsouderou the dispute may be resolved if the VMRO party breaks up, and there are signs that this may already be happening. Tsouderou is hoping that the nationalistic leadership of the party is replaced.

"They must come to their senses."

#### Hungarian Minority Leader's Letter to Milosevic

92BA0840A Novi Sad MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian  
18 Apr 92 p 6

[Letter from Andras Agoston, president of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Vojvodina, to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic: "Constitutional and Political Status for Hungarians"—first paragraph is MAGYAR SZO introduction]

[Text] Andras Agoston, Democratic Union of Hungarians in Vojvodina [VMDK] president, addressed Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in a letter dated 14 April. The text of the letter (with title and subtitles provided by the editors) is as follows:

Dear Mr. President,

Most recent statements by competent political entities heard throughout the world, as well as resolutions passed and positions taken by international bodies of extreme importance to us, necessitate that I recommend to you the following: Within the scope of your constitutional and political authority you should initiate dialogue between representatives of the appropriate organs in power and of the Democratic Union of Vojvodina [as published] in order to reach an agreement concerning the situation of the Hungarian national minority in Serbia. Such dialogue should have as its starting point the fact that the situation of this minority continues to remain open and unresolved.

These discussions should probably begin by dealing with the most timely topics. I would like to mention a few of these.

#### A Series of Slandorous Statements

1. The psychological war and the heavy war propaganda being waged against the VMDK and its leadership, and, in general, against Hungarians residing in the Vojvodina.

The news media, primarily the news media of Vojvodina, and within that the Serbian language media in particular, as well as politicians and other officials of the ruling structure, are the lead actors in these activities. Related slanderous statements that are farthest from the truth are as follows: The VMDK receives its instructions from the Hungarian Republic, and secession is the ultimate goal of the VMDK. The VMDK calls for desertion. The VMDK picks quarrels between Hungarians and Serbians, and deteriorates the otherwise excellent relations between the two nations. The VMDK falsely portrays the situation and fate of Hungarians for consumption abroad, and is not willing to recognize the fact that Hungarians of Vojvodina enjoy more rights than any other minority in this whole wide world.

We may generally assert that VMDK documents, and statements by VMDK representatives, do not provide grounds for these statements. Instead, these statements have their basis in the fact that as a result of self-organizing efforts, the Hungarian national minority of Serbia has succeeded in developing a political identity of its own, and that based on this identity it has established a political opportunity to express its true interests, i.e., that by now, the Hungarian national minority of Serbia is no longer willing to utter words of gratitude in this regard and to accept all that is offered to it by the prevailing power.

The VMDK has not reacted to these statements thus far because in its judgment the war propaganda exerted against the VMDK and against Hungarians in Vojvodina has not accomplished its fundamental goal at all: People continue to support the Democratic Union of Vojvodina and are willing to declare their collective interests, bravely standing fast in the political arena.

I would mention briefly the references [*remissza*] that serve as the foundation for psychological warfare and for war propaganda, only to inform the Serbian public about the attacks against the VMDK and against Hungarians in Vojvodina in general.

#### Secession Out of the Question

As the legitimate political interest group of Hungarians in the Vojvodina, the VMDK conducts its activities independently, in a manner consistent with the most general interests of this minority group. It has developed an extremely proper and good cooperative relationship with the Hungarian organs of power having jurisdiction. It wishes to establish an identical cooperative relationship with the organs of power of the Serbian Republic. Whenever the VMDK has made such initiatives in the past, those initiatives have been rejected, or have not been responded to at all. On the other hand it is also true that Hungarians in the Vojvodina would like to see that the Hungarian state becomes part of the EC at the earliest possible date, and these people would do nothing to hinder Hungary on this path. We have the same desires regarding ourselves and Serbia; this, however, should not even be a subject of debate. Considering these

facts, Hungary is not encouraging us to secede, and neither the VMDK nor the Hungarians of Vojvodina do anything that could suggest an intent to secede. Hungary has recognized the present borders toward all of its neighbors. This has been a logical step of course, because with borders in dispute, Hungary would probably not have even the slightest chance to join the EC member states.

The VMDK's position has remained unchanged from the beginning relative to the Yugoslav civil war (and to clarify in advance any misunderstanding regarding this term, we call attention to the use of this term by Jacques Delors, a leading personality of the EC). Foremost of all, we would like to voice our desire to keep Hungarians of the Vojvodina out of the historical debate between the South Slavic people, i.e., removed from the decision on how these people perceive the future of their common lives. The VMDK stressed at the time the war broke out that based on the provisions of the basic charter of Paris, to which Yugoslavia also happens to be a signatory, the VMDK has not identified a single problem that could only be resolved by war. Using this as its starting point, the VMDK stood up against the war and, in general, against mobilization, and mainly against the mobilization of Hungarians, because Hungarians did not want to wage war. The VMDK stressed that in its view the mobilization was unconstitutional and also illegal. As we did before, we continue to believe today that it is the individual's sovereign right to decide how to react to the draft in times of war. We support those who rejected the idea of a civil war and escaped from the country after receiving the summons, but we also support those who agreed to go to the front, short of finding another solution. And finally, we also support those who received a summons but did not go to the front, and did not escape from the country either. I trust that all this makes it clear that the charge, which holds that we called upon people to desert, is none other than an absurdity from the standpoint of logic. This charge has been invented for propaganda purposes.

#### The World Believes Us

But let us go further. Statements to the effect that VMDK representatives travel throughout the world primarily because they have failed to succeed in engaging in dialogue in Serbia, and seek support for the establishment of an autonomy that would guarantee to Hungarians of Vojvodina the preservation of their national identity, are true. VMDK representatives in the big, wide world do not chitchat about certain propaganda claims according to which the rights of minorities are nowhere as broad as here. People in the world are not willing to blindly accept any propaganda; they formulate positions on the basis of things they know. It is equally true, of course, that the VMDK regularly calls attention abroad to the activities of those in power, the steps taken by those in power that reduce or discontinue one or another minority right that has existed before. In this regard we are talking primarily about language use, culture, education, and information. The fact that we

have made contact more than 50 times with representatives of those in power and with persons in top leadership positions at parties and political organizations, and further, the realistic positions that appear in official documents relative to our demands as a minority, go to prove at least two things: first, that the world believes us, and second, that our conclusions are regarded as realistic.

#### **Forcible Mobilization**

2. On forcible mobilization, on leaving the country, and on loyalty to the state.

I am convinced that open and realistic political discourse could contribute to relieving the present situation, and separately, to resolving the situation of the Hungarian national minority in Serbia. In this conjunction it must be pointed out that the Hungarian nationality is primarily concerned about two problems. One is that due to the violence manifested in the course of mobilization and to the extremely heavy war propaganda. At least 20,000 Hungarian men and family members of military age do not dare to return to the country. Another aspect of this concern is the already publicized serious political intent to forcefully change the ethnic composition of the populace—a rather great threat from our standpoint—by prohibiting the return of refugees and by other means, even though such action is also prohibited by documents adopted by the UN. The other problem pertains to the fact that far more Hungarians are being mobilized than the number that could be realistically justified based on the ratio they represent as compared to the Serbian populace. Considering the fact that people returning from the front usually report about assignments mainly in the first front lines, claims to the effect that these people are being discriminated against as a result of endangering their basic human and collective rights cannot be regarded as lacking foundations. Unfortunately, the political position that has been clearly expressed in Zenta [Senta], Ada, Moravica, and other municipalities in the course of political demonstrations has not produced results: Forcible mobilization continues to remain on the agenda.

#### **Our Loyalty Cannot Be Questioned**

We must also talk about loyalty of citizens to their state. Hungarians of Vojvodina are loyal citizens of this state. They are loyal, if we regard loyalty as a duty and a willingness to preserve internationally recognized borders when an external enemy attacks these borders. Since we cannot speak of this kind of loyalty in the present civil war, holding people to account for alleged disloyalty is none other than, unfortunately, a rather huge and dangerous means used in psychological warfare and in war propaganda, one that strikes the Hungarian national minority in Serbia.

The use of physical and psychological force in the course of mobilization has a grave impact on Hungarians in Vojvodina. In a constitutional state, refusal to accept a

summons could, at most, serve as grounds to initiate appropriate legal proceedings to find out whether a person has violated a rule or if he was criminally responsible, and not even by accident could such refusal be used as a pretext for the use of force. Not even in a single instance, regardless of the number of such cases.

Because positions taken by competent international factors are also clear and unequivocal in this regard, it might not hurt to shed more light on the need for the state to make a gesture and call upon all of its citizens to return home without being threatened at all, and without any consequence flowing from the civil war. The fact that this problem is not unique insofar as the Hungarian national minority in Serbia is concerned, and that it affects every citizen who has been forced to leave the country under war conditions and because of the heavy war propaganda, is self-evident.

#### **About the Constitution Now Being Prepared**

3. Provisions to be found in the working draft of the constitution of the Yugoslav Federal Republic have a few extremely serious shortcomings, and for this reason the working draft must not be regarded as complete from the standpoint of relations between nations, and must not be regarded as appropriate as a modern, democratic settlement of the situation of nationality groups in a state with several nationalities.

Rejection of realities by the framers of the constitution can also be seen from the constitution's failure to recognize the *de facto* situation that Serbia, and even the Yugoslav Federal Republic, are unions of multiple nationalities. This attitude alone suggests anti-democratic solutions when it comes to specific legislation. And, further: The working draft does not recognize the collective rights and the legal and political identities of nationality groups. As a result of the above, as presently worded, the constitution would be in direct violation of one of the fundamental tenets of the document adopted at The Hague, the one that provides a basis for the Brussels peacemaking process. And finally, the working draft does not mention autonomous jurisdictions at all, even though such jurisdictions appear with increasing frequency as mandatory institutions for settling the situations of nationality groups in the course of building a new European order.

All this points to a need that legitimate representatives of nationality groups be appropriately involved in drafting the constitution of the Yugoslav Federal Republic. Only as a result of the free clashing of arguments, and only on the basis of good intentions by the ruling structure, could one find democratic solutions for the situation of nationality groups in the new state.

#### **We Urge Dialogue**

Mr. President, I am aware of the fact that this is a historical moment, and I know that the Serbian people and you, personally, are forced to make grave decisions that are bound to directly affect the future of the Serbian



people in these areas. I want to assure you that the Hungarian nationality group in Serbia does not want to make the situation of the Serbian people more difficult. We must coexist; we are linked by a multitude of common factors. The VMDK is also aware of its own historical responsibility, because it knows that at this time, the situation of Hungarians in this area is going to be settled for the next century. For this reason, the VMDK uses all means to acquire a constitutional and political status for this nationality group, a status that is able to guarantee a democratic way of life and the preservation and further development of our national identity. We feel that our endeavors thus far, which have been democratic and realistic, fit into the Brussels peace process without reservations, and that they are consistent with the stated plans of Lord Carrington.

Hoping that you, too, will regard dialogue with representatives of the VMDK concerning the situation of the Hungarian nationality as something that is in your interest, I remain, respectfully yours,

Andras Agoston  
President, VMDK

#### **Gen Trifunovic Under Court-Martial in Belgrade**

92BA0811A *Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian*  
13 Apr 92 pp 25-27

[Article by Nenad Lj. Stefanovic: "Traitor or Corpse"—first paragraph is VREME introduction]

[Text] The upcoming trial and the lawyers' interpretations of this complex case will show how and whether General Trifunovic erred, and whether he really was in a hopeless position for saving something that others, long before him, had already lost.

The section of the public that has been working exclusively for months now on the production and identification of traitors and deserters, instead of the traditional production of enemies, could soon experience complete satisfaction, after the trial of Gen. Vlado Trifunovic and seven other officers from the former Varazdin corps. If the Council of Five of the Military Court in Belgrade, which is chaired by Colonel Milos Saljic, approves all the allegations in the indictment that charges the group of officers from the Varazdin corps with undermining the military and defensive power of the armed forces of the SFRY, that public, after so many cultural and public workers, opposition politicians, peace activists, and people who fled the country, will finally officially get a traitor with general's epaulets. In the event that Gen. Trifunovic and his colleagues, however, by the court's decision do not end up as traitors, part of that same primitive public has already thought of a solution: "If the court fails, the general will be sentenced by soldiers from the front."

If the court's council, however, approves the requests from the defense for an appearance at the hearing by the witnesses, Lieutenant General Blagoje Adzic, former

Federal Secretary for National Defense Veljko Kadijevic, and also Generals Zivota Avramovic and Dobrasin Prascevic, this trial could grow from "mere confirmation of the status as traitors" of the group of officers into one of the most interesting courts-martial ever held in this area. It would be incomparably more interesting, for example, than the two previous spectacular military trials of Jansa and Spegelj, which did not win military justice too much glory. (In the first case, a marginal politician was turned into a national hero, and in the second, a person who had previously been a volunteer for several months in the KOS [military counterintelligence] spy films, and then finally escaped from them, was tried in absentia.) What could make the trial of Gen. Vlado Trifunovic, which is to begin in the Military Court in Belgrade on 13 April, particularly interesting is not just the serious accusation made against that officer, nor the possible appearance of such significant witnesses, but also the entire nonlegal context in which this kind of trial can be placed today.

#### **Mistaken Assessment**

The indictment that was signed by the military prosecutor, Lieutenant Colonel Momir Koprivica, charges Gen. Trifunovic and the group of officers from the Varazdin corps, above all, with surrendering to the enemy, as a result of which most of the soldiers and officers were captured, along with a large amount of combat equipment and ammunition. Even though, in the prosecutor's opinion, it was already obvious at the beginning of last September that a struggle with Croatian paramilitary formations was imminent, the officers of the Varazdin corps did not undertake all the necessary measures to prepare themselves for a persistent and prolonged struggle and cooperation with units from neighboring cities. In Varazdin itself and in its vicinity, Gen. Trifunovic's corps possessed several minor military installations, which, according to the criticisms of the general today, should have been abandoned so that all the available forces could be concentrated on what, according to the indictment, could and should be defended with the existing enormous resources of weapons and ammunition. Trifunovic, however, tried to defend every installation, fragmented the available forces, and soon entered a hopeless position, having lost the opportunity for the prolonged struggle that was expected of him.

Several days after the attack against the garrison in Varazdin, the accused officers, without authorization, began to negotiate with representatives of the Varazdin Crisis Headquarters, and on 22 September 1991, according to the indictment, they surrendered their units to the enemy, also without authorization and contrary to an explicit order from a superior command. They did this even though, as the military prosecutor emphasizes, they were expected to "defend themselves to the last bullet," and "many people who were fighting against the fascist genocide" later suffered from the weapons that fell into the hands of the Croatian paramilitary units. The indictment also lists in detail everything from the

Varazdin corps that was surrendered to the enemy paramilitary units. The most significant items on this truly imposing list, of course, are 74 T-55 tanks, 61 armored transports, 27 tons of explosives, 25,000 grenades, and a large amount of infantry and heavy weapons.

#### Left in the Lurch

Gen. Vlado Trifunovic does not even deny many of these facts in his statement given during the investigative proceedings. His explanation of the Varazdin story, however, also reveals a great deal that leaves sufficient room to suspect that this man was actually "left in the lurch," as he himself stubbornly claims, and that from the very beginning he actually played a desperate game in which his entire choice was reduced to one single dilemma—a corpse or a traitor.

Gen. Trifunovic came to the post of commandant of the Varazdin garrison only three months before he had to withdraw to Serbia at the end of September, along with what remained of that corps. The first thing that he faced after assuming his duties was the mass desertions and departures of officers and soldiers to the other side. Those who later headed the attacks against the Varazdin corps' installations included a considerable number of officers who had occupied the most responsible positions, and often even intelligence positions, in that same corps just a few months earlier. At the same time, at the moment of the attack, in the unit itself there were several officers upon whom Trifunovic obviously should not and could not have relied. Trifunovic persistently requested that his superiors allow him to reinforce his depleted units in personnel and numbers. On several occasions, he also discussed this with the chief of the General Staff, Blagoje Adzic. A written trace of one such conversation, conducted on one night in July, has remained (actually at the request of the chief of the General Staff), which is also the reason why the defense is insisting that Adzic appear in court as a witness. Gen. Trifunovic complained on that occasion that after the Slovene war, the size of his corps was substantially reduced, as a result of casualties, wounds, and the capture of officers and soldiers, as well as voluntary desertion of the unit. He felt that the unit had to be reinforced with personnel at least up to the level of a peacetime formation, and stated very precisely how many people and how many specialties he was lacking in order to complete the crews of combat vehicles. Gen. Adzic considered all these requests justified, but reinforcements did not arrive before the beginning of the attacks against military installations in Varazdin, even though Trifunovic was expected to launch "offensive actions."

During the investigation, Gen. Trifunovic answered one of the main points in the indictment—that he had fragmented his forces and had not concentrated the units he had available on several of the most important defensive points, and thus made the enemy's work easier—by recalling the written and verbal orders from

his superior officer, Gen. Zivota Avramovic, that every installation had to be held for the units that would be withdrawn from Slovenia and would arrive as reinforcements. The prosecutor claims that such an order could only have applied to peacetime conditions. Vlado Trifunovic is also very convincing when he emphasizes (and offers evidence) that that order was in effect right up until the beginning of the attack upon the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] in Varazdin.

In any case, from the beginning of that attack to the final abandonment of Varazdin, long weeks of waiting for the announced assistance to arrive passed. The barracks in which the corps command was located was fired upon for days with all types of weapons, and evidence of a new concentration of enemy forces arrived through radio communications. After several fierce assaults, and calls to surrender day and night from an incomparably stronger enemy, the continual dissipation of the unit, psychological pressures by means of family members, trickery, and the awareness that the neighboring garrisons were surrendering one after another, on 22 September Vlado Trifunovic agreed that under certain conditions he would withdraw his unit from Varazdin, leaving behind him a large amount of weapons, partly made incapable of rapid use. During the investigation, he tried to explain what would have happened if the unit had been completely captured ("they would have massacred us"), and whether a sacrifice, i.e., "fighting until the last bullet," would have made any sense. "Our sacrifice," the defendant explained in the investigation, "would essentially not have changed anything, because there probably would have been an even worse situation, as well as more serious consequence, both with respect to the equipment that the enemy obtained, and with respect to the number of casualties...." By taking advantage of hostages who had been captured previously, Gen. Trifunovic played the last possible card except for the suicidal one—he withdrew from Varazdin all the officers and soldiers and their families, destroyed all the documentation on hand, and partly crippled the equipment.

#### Court-Martial Before the Court-Martial

Gen. Trifunovic's arrest came a full month and a half after this event. It was preceded by more frequent newspaper claims of treason and announcements of arrests, in which the journalists usually cited well-informed circles close to the military leadership. The first such article was published in NARODNA ARMIJA, from the pen of Bojan Miroslavljev, a journalist who later went over to the other side and deserted the JNA, as attorney Branko Stanic, Gen. Trifunovic's defender, claims. The signer, Miroslavljev, the alleged author of this article, later contacted attorney Stanic in writing and explained that he had never written that article and that his signature in NARODNA ARMIJA had been forged. Other newspapers, in creating a lynching atmosphere ("wherever Trifunovic is now and whatever he is doing...he will be judged by the heroes from the front who are bleeding for freedom...."), persistently repeated Seselj's thesis that the essence of Trifunovic's treason

was that he had not turned Varazdin into a Vukovar, because in that case all of Slavonia would have been "ours." Instead of this, it is claimed, "he made the Ustase a gift of the tanks from which our sons, whom we will avenge, are dying today." One could also read that Trifunovic "committed treason because of his wife, a Croat." (If it matters at all for this story, both of them are of Serbian nationality, and were born in the same village, Rakilica in Bosanska Krajina, where they were also married.) His guilt was thus "proven" even before his arrest and court-martial. Side by side with the trial in the Military Court in Belgrade, criminal proceedings have also been instituted against Gen. Trifunovic in Zagreb, where the authorities there are accusing him of crimes against the civilian population, because several installations were destroyed during the struggle in Varazdin. Most of the accused officers from the Varazdin Corps are in a similar position, but the record holder among them is certainly Colonel Berislav Popov, against whom, in addition to two different court proceedings in Belgrade and Zagreb for the same event, a third is also being prepared in Slovenia, for war crimes. Popov has also received a threatening letter from certain people in Krajina, who told him that they would sentence him as a "traitor and coward," whereas they would "spare his family."

After those who already passed sentence a long time ago, the turn of the Military Court, the only one competent to determine what really happened, has finally come. From all indications, Gen. Trifunovic's court-martial will only be the overture in a series of similar courts-martial of officers with very high rank. According to some views, those courts-martial will be initiated in order to protect those with the highest ranks in the military hierarchy at least from general responsibility, and in order to stop the stories about the army's incompetence and mass betrayals. In most of those courts-martial, as well as in this premiere, one can expect duels between the advocates of the thesis of the necessity of defending "until the last bullet," and the logic that in the given conditions the most that could be done seemed to be saving people from massacre and absolute destruction. After everything that has happened with the army from the beginning of the

Slovene war until today, the question "What happens after the last bullet?" also seems very logical in this Varazdin case as well. In any case, if withdrawing from a certain territory without bloodshed and the deliberate sacrifice of people, while leaving a large amount of weapons and equipment, is a criminal act, then dozens of generals (starting with those in the highest positions) still remain unpunished for identical or similar acts, because both before and after Varazdin incomparably larger military depots and incomparably larger amounts of weapons have been left behind without this having been considered treason.

In Gen. Trifunovic's case, much of this suggests the conclusion that it would all have been the same even "after the last bullet"; Varazdin would have fallen, and most of the tanks, ammunition, and equipment would have ended up in the hands of the Croatian soldiers. It is just that Gen. Trifunovic would perhaps have gone into legend as a modern version of Major Gavrilovic, who heroically sacrificed himself in the defense of written-off Belgrade. In that case his wife, instead of a Croat, would have become a proud widow and a real Serbian woman, who preserves in a prominent place in her apartment the posthumous medal of her husband, the brave man from Krajina, and whose two brothers perished in the NOB [National Liberation Struggle].

The upcoming court-martial and the lawyers' interpretations of this complicated case will show how and whether Gen. Trifunovic erred, and whether he really was in a hopeless position for saving something that others had already lost long before him. That dilemma, which the general himself mentioned during the investigation, will also perhaps be his strongest trump card in the upcoming court-martial.

"As a man and an officer, I constantly ask myself why we were put in that situation, more precisely, in a difficult situation, why no one helped us, and why we were left in the lurch. I do not evade my own responsibility for a single moment, if it exists at all and to the extent that it exists, but in this country and in the JNA itself there is probably someone else who is guilty for this corps, as well as numerous JNA units, faring as they did...."



**END OF**

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